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Summary 
This thesis is a study of the Nordic embassies in Tokyo and the different ways in which they 
chose to respond to the nuclear crisis following the massive earthquake and tsunami off the 
Pacific coast of Tohoku, Japan, on March 11, 2011. Although the embassies technically were 
subject to the same level of threat, their individual crisis responses have exhibited varying 
levels of precaution. For example, while the Swedish and Danish embassies remained fully 
operational in Tokyo, the Norwegian and Finnish embassies relocated most or all of their staff 
to provisional operations further away from the nuclear hazard. As a researcher in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), the wide display of responses raises an interesting 
question concerning the basic circumstances of nuclear risk, for how can the same 
circumstances generate such different scientific assessments and management strategies? 
What underlying considerations particular to the individual embassy can explain the Nordic 
variation in crisis responses? 
 
In accordance with the teachings of Dorothy Nelkin, the uncertain nature of nuclear radiation 
compounds the difficulties of risk assessment and leaves considerable scope for subjective 
factors to enter both scientific interpretations and public perceptions. With regard to the 
Nordic crisis responses, it becomes clear that various political, reputational, and economic 
interests have influenced the different outcomes. Yet, as it turns out, even coinciding interests 
may produce differing risk evaluations. By way of a methodical application of Cultural 
Theory (c.f. Mary Douglas et al.), this study shows how embassy diplomats with few personal 
ties to their Japanese communities have been more prone to opt for a higher degree of 
precaution, i.e. embassy relocation, than those more integrated in Japanese society. 
 
The interesting angle of a Nordic-specific comparison (as opposed to, say, a comparison 
between the Norwegian and Japanese crisis responses) is the fact that it becomes hard to 
argue “Culture” as the main explanatory factor behind the differences. As the thesis 
demonstrates, concerns about risk may depend less on culture at large than on social, 
contextual, or political biases. 
5	  
Acknowledgments 
A number of people have helped me in a number of ways: 
 
I want to thank all the embassy officials and scientific delegates for taking time out of their 
busy schedules to go along with my inquiries. 
 
Deep gratitude goes out to my mother for sharing her embassy network with me and for all 
her support throughout my studies. 
 
A huge thanks to my supervisor, Professor Göran Sundqvist, without whose helpful 
suggestions and encouragement this paper would not have been possible. 
 
Special thanks to fellow students Veronika, Irene, and Mariya for their laughter and support 
along the way, and to the ever-patient Magnus for seeing me through to the end. 
6	  
1. Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the Nordic embassies in Tokyo and the different ways in which they 
chose to respond to the nuclear crisis following the massive earthquake and tsunami off the 
Pacific coast of Tohoku, Japan, on March 11, 2011. More generally, this thesis examines the 
porous relationship between science and policy and the complex practices of assessing 
nuclear risk. 
 
Although the situation at the Fukushima nuclear plant, as of November 2011, remains very 
serious (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011), the general feeling of urgency around 
the situation has died down and operations in Tokyo have resumed normal activity. In the 
weeks following the initial outbreak, however, the reactions among the foreign delegations to 
Japan were diverse; while some embassies (for example the Swedish and Danish) saw no 
need to evacuate the capital, others (such as the Norwegian and the Finnish embassies) rushed 
to temporarily close down or relocate out of Tokyo while recommending their nationals to do 
the same. As a researcher in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), this wide 
display of responses raises an interesting question concerning the basic circumstances of 
nuclear risk, for how can the same circumstances generate such different scientific 
assessments and management strategies? Technically the embassies were all subject to the 
same level of threat and were otherwise seemingly under equal conditions, yet the security 
assessments and precautionary measures varied greatly from embassy to embassy. The aim of 
this thesis is to explain how and why such divergent policies were adopted.  
 
The focus of the study shall be on the Nordic embassies in Tokyo, that is to say, the crisis 
responses of the Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, and Danish embassies respectively. My point 
of departure is the Norwegian Embassy, whose particular management will be given special 
emphasis – partly due to personal affiliation as a Norwegian national myself, but mainly in 
order to gain a thorough understanding of the dealings and processes within an embassy in 
general. Such insight is important as we venture on to an overall comparative analysis of the 
Nordic managements. Although close in political relations and in national cultures, the Nordic 
embassies have exhibited varying degrees of precaution in their crisis managements. What 
underlying considerations particular to the individual embassy can explain the Nordic 
variation in crisis responses? The interesting angle of a Nordic-specific comparison (as 
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opposed to, say, a comparison between the Norwegian and Japanese crisis responses) is the 
fact that it becomes hard to argue “Culture” as the main explanatory factor behind the 
differences. As this study shall demonstrate, concerns about risk may depend less on culture 
at large than on social, contextual, or political biases. In fact, not even among scientists does 
there seem to exist a uniform understanding of risk. 
 
The Government of Japan has formally decided to use the term “Great East Japan 
Earthquake” to refer collectively to the disasters due to the March 11 earthquake, tsunami, 
and resultant nuclear plant accidents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011). However, 
as this thesis mainly deals with the nuclear consequences and not so much the earthquake-
tsunami outset, the term does not adequately reflect the objectives of this study. Instead, this 
thesis will refer to the incidents collectively as the “Great East Japan Crisis” – or more often, 
simply as “the crisis”. 
 
1.1 The Great East Japan Crisis 
At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, an earthquake occurred 130 km off the Pacific coast of Japan’s 
Tohoku-district, approximately 380 km north of Tokyo. The initial shock measured at a 
magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it the fourth strongest quake in recorded history 
(The Heritage Foundation, 2011). Following the quake, a massive tsunami swept across the 
northeast coast of Japan causing widespread devastation. An overwhelming number of people 
were displaced from their homes in the Tohoku region, and more than 15.000 lives were lost 
while 4.000 people remain missing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011).  
 
In addition to loss of life and destruction of infrastructure, the earthquake and tsunami caused 
a number of nuclear accidents, primarily at three reactors in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power 
Plant maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). For fear of long-term 
radiation hazards, the Japanese government ordered the mass evacuation of residents from 
within a 20-km mandatory evacuation zone around the Fukushima power plant (Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency, Japan, 2011). 
 
On April 12, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that the Fukushima 
nuclear accident was rated as a Level 7 on the INES scale, which is the most serious scale 
value used to describe “a major release of radioactive material with widespread health and 
environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures”. 
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Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 accident on record. As of 
June 2011, water is still being poured into the damaged reactors to cool the melting fuel rods 
and the situation “remains very serious” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). 
 
In its security measures regarding the nuclear threat, Japan has been careful to act in 
accordance with IAEA nuclear safety standards (The Japan Times, 2011). One of the statutory 
functions of the IAEA is to establish “standards of safety for protection of health, life and 
property against ionizing radiation” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). However, 
these safety standards are “non-binding” on national regulations; they may be adopted by 
IAEA member states “at their own discretion” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). 
There is in other words no single international instrument of a legally binding nature to offer 
guidance for the harmonization of national laws and regulations. As a result, the international 
reactions have varied greatly, although it is safe to say that the foreign directives have shown 
a higher degree of precaution than the Japanese. 
 
On March14, France became the first country to advise its nationals to leave Tokyo, citing the 
nuclear risk associated with the accident at the Fukushima power plant (Financial Times, 
2011). In the following days, several embassies of other countries repeated similar advice. In 
the 11 days following the March 11 quake and tsunami, over 161.000 foreigners left Japan, an 
eightfold increase from about 20.000 during the same period in 2010 (Economic Times, 
2011). And these figures do not account for all those who relocated within Japan. 
 
As a matter of fact, the massive exodus of foreigners caused a new word – fly-jin – to enter 
the Japanese vocabulary. A pun on the word gai-jin, the Japanese word for foreigners, fly-jin 
refers to the flight of the foreigners in response to the nuclear threat, but also their desertion 
of the Japanese people in their times of hardship (Wall Street Journal, 2011). Needless to say, 
the connotation is not exactly complementary. It becomes clear that many of the foreign 
reactions to the nuclear threat involve a high degree of social stigma in the Japanese 
communities. Such social factors become an important focus when studying the causes behind 
the different Nordic risk assessments and crisis responses. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
In connection with the Great East Japan Crisis, each of the Nordic regimes has issued official 
travel recommendations to their citizens that have been updated in accordance with the 
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situations development. However, a comparison among the Nordic travel recommendations 
shows considerable discrepancies with regard to levels of precaution; although all the Nordic 
countries at one point or another advised that their citizens avoid all travel to Japan, the 
duration of the restriction ranged all from one week to one month. Other types of security 
directives – regarding issues such as potassium iodide tablets as a preventative measure 
against radiation poisoning, or specially arranged flights to transport citizens out of Japan – 
have differed as well, as have security measures taken by the embassies themselves. For 
example, while the Swedish and Danish embassies remained fully operational in Tokyo, the 
Norwegian and Finnish embassies relocated most or all of their staff to provisional operations 
further away from the nuclear hazard. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on the Nordic embassies in Tokyo. However, certain security 
directives, for example the official travel recommendations, are formally issued by the foreign 
ministries in the respective capitals. The embassies in Tokyo are nevertheless taken into 
consultation. In this connection, it would be interesting to find out to what degree the 
respective embassies in Tokyo are involved in devising the official travel recommendations. 
Are the embassy opinions in accordance with the ministry directives? To what extent are the 
embassies obliged to follow the official travel recommendations in their own operations? 
How are such official directives devised? On what grounds are decisions regarding embassy 
security made? How does, or does not, the individual embassy’s crisis response reflect the 
attitudes among its own staff? What can explain the variation in crisis responses? 
Specifically, the aim of my study will be to answer the following research questions: 
 
(1) In connection with the Fukushima nuclear crisis, how has the Norwegian Embassy 
responded to the situation, and what considerations and interests have influenced this 
crisis response? 
 
(2) Seeing that the Nordic embassies have responded to the crisis in different ways, how can 
such different strategies be explained? 
 
Before going into further detail on each of the research questions, it is important to explain 
the particular denotation of “crisis response” in the context of this study. Throughout the 
thesis, “crisis response” refers to two main categories of investigation: official security 
directives to citizens (i.e. travel advice, recommendations concerning iodide tablets, and the 
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arrangement of special flights out of Japan) and the respective embassy’s own security 
precautions (i.e. the relocation of embassy operations and the management of embassy 
personnel). 
 
The first research question (1), then, addresses the Norwegian crisis management exclusively. 
This is in order to gain particular insights into the decision-making processes and internal 
interests of the Norwegian Embassy, which will serve as a useful reference in the further 
analysis. It is important to note that the objective of this first research question is simply to 
map out the various dealings and interests that have influenced the Norwegian crisis response; 
the interpretive analysis shall mainly take place in conjunction with the overall comparison of 
the Nordic responses, which falls under the domain of the second research question. 
 
Thus, the second research question (2) focuses on a comparative analysis of the Norwegian, 
Swedish, Finnish and Danish crisis responses. The considerations and interests of each of the 
Nordic managements shall be examined in order to discover discrepancies that may explain 
the variation in crisis responses. As we shall see, evaluating risks requires interpretive 
judgment in the face of technical uncertainty and scientific disagreement. Thus, an important 
aspect of this second research question is to investigate the way in which scientific expertise 
is applied in government policy. 
 
1.3 Research design, setting and methodology 
The research methods employed in this study are primarily qualitative interviews and 
documentary studies of official directives and statements, supplemented with various 
accounts from media. All the interviews in the study, 9 in total, were conducted in Tokyo, 
May 2011. In the course of my stay there I was able to interview officials from the 
Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Danish embassies. I also spoke with a representative at the 
Swiss embassy, but given the basic restrictions on my study, this thesis does not discuss the 
Swiss Embassy’s crisis response in particular. The interview with the Swiss representative has 
nevertheless proved useful as a background reference. 
 
Insofar as possible I have interviewed one political and one scientific attaché at each embassy. 
Throughout the thesis I refer to these as “diplomats” and “science officers” respectively, 
unless specifically signified with formal title. In addition, I have interviewed two close 
affiliates of the Norwegian Embassy representing the two Norwegian agencies that happen to 
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hold offices within the Embassy grounds: Innovation Norway (IN) and the Norwegian 
Seafood Export Council (NSEC). Henceforth, they shall be referred to as “Embassy affiliates” 
collectively, or as the “IN representative” and the “NSEC representative” respectively. (The 
IN representative and the Norwegian science officer are in fact one and the same person; his 
position is both with IN and the Embassy.) As it turns out, sharing the Embassy compound 
poses certain conflicts of interest for the parties involved. Such information is of interest 
when studying factors that have influenced the Norwegian Embassy’s course of action. 
Moreover, the two affiliates were an active part of the Embassy’s crisis team and could 
provide important insight on internal processes within the Embassy. Below is an overview of 
the interviews that have been carried out in connection with the study. 
 
Embassy 
 
Interviews Designations 
Norway 3  1 diplomat + 1 science officer / IN rep. + 1 NSEC rep. 
Sweden 2  1 diplomat + 1 science officer 
Finland 2  1 diplomat + 1 science officer 
Denmark 
 
1  1 diplomat 
Switzerland 1  1 diplomat 
 
I was well received by all of the delegates that I spoke with, although as interview subjects I 
found some of them to be a bit reserved; the diplomats were too diplomatic, so to speak. In 
certain cases it was exceedingly difficult to get direct answers, here with explicit reference to 
the Norwegian Ambassador. Contrary to the others, the Norwegian Ambassador never 
wavered from his role as an official spokesman, always answering on behalf of the 
organization and in plural form, even when I specifically asked about his personal opinion. 
He also retracted his initial consent to let me question others among his staff, not even to 
discuss purely factual matters. As he explained, he had consulted with the Ministry on the 
issue and come to the conclusion that allowing such inquiries would be imprudent; it might 
touch upon sensitive information exempt from public disclosure. In my opinion it seems that 
the Ambassador suddenly became concerned about the repercussions of my study and did not 
want it to expose any opposing opinions among the Embassy staff. Still, I do not feel that this 
has thwarted my mission; the intent of my inquiries was not so much to expose personal 
considerations as to broaden my empirical basis and understanding of how the decision-
making processes work within the Norwegian Embassy – the focus of this study is after all 
the Embassy’s official management, not its subjects. On this account I received ample input 
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on relevant internal dealings from the two Embassy affiliates, and the Ambassador’s 
restriction did not hinder me in speaking with the Embassy’s science officer, largely due to 
the fact that the science officer’s main employment is with Innovation Norway, as deputy to 
the Tokyo IN office – and he was more than willing to go along with my inquiries. In a sense, 
the Ambassador’s dilemma was actually quite revealing; in pursuit of the underlying 
considerations that have affected the Norwegian Embassy’s crisis management, clearly public 
reputation is a major concern.  
 
When discussing a proper methodological approach, it is necessary to mention that my 
mother works for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and is currently stationed at the Norwegian 
Embassy in Tokyo. Naturally, this influenced my choice of case as it involved the benefit of 
working on my thesis directly from the Embassy grounds, as well as a certain guarantee of 
access to the people and materials that I sought. I have not, however, formally interviewed my 
mother as a part of this study. This is partly because the Ambassador did not allow any 
interviews with the Embassy staff members, and partly because I wanted to study the 
embassies in a symmetrical manner, that is, as far as possible maintain a detached association 
to all accounts. My mother has, however, been helpful in such things as confirming dates and 
factual information. 
 
The amount of explanatory power that can be extracted from a single case study is limited. 
Such studies are often seen to be interpretive explorations of social phenomena, but the 
findings are not necessarily transferable to other cases within the same field. This thesis, 
however, comprises multiple cases; each of the Nordic embassies – the Norwegian, Swedish, 
Finnish, and Danish – represents an individual entity of study, thereby expanding the validity 
of any analytic generalizations that may be drawn. Analytic conclusions arising from a 
multiple-case study are generally regarded as more compelling and more robust than those 
coming from a single case alone (Yin, 2009, p. 53). Yet even when limited to the level of a 
single case study, the contextual nature of the case can be overwhelming for an analyst unless 
equipped with a theoretical approach that provides room for processing such multifaceted 
impressions. Deciding on such a theoretical framework shall be the focus of the following 
chapter. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The multifaceted and contextual nature of the case study calls for a theoretical understanding 
of the topic that is equally compound in scope. Accordingly, this chapter shall emphasize the 
importance of an approach to studying risk that extends beyond a narrow technical 
understanding to include a focus on risk as a social concept. The chapter introduces the two 
main theoretical frameworks to be employed in the analysis of this study: Dorothy Nelkin’s 
(et al.) discussions on the mutual influence between science and politics, and Mary Douglas’ 
(et al.) culturalist approach to risk, more often known as Cultural Theory. 
 
But first of all, the chapter begins with a review of the various approaches that have guided 
studies of risk assessment. Such an overview is important to understand the focus of this 
study. As pointed out by Judith Bradbury (1989, p. 380), unless all dimensions of a problem 
are taken into account, it is likely that attempts will be made to solve the wrong problem. 
 
2.1. Approaches to risk 
Traditionally, risk concepts have been developed within a framework where risk is technically 
defined. The technical concept of risk reflects a view of scientific knowledge as composed of 
objective facts. Technical risk assessments seek to calculate in an objective manner the 
probabilities of a hazardous event, to identify the consequences for human health, and to 
estimate the likelihood of these consequences. As a result, technical perspectives are often 
criticized for being overly quantitative and reductive. Moreover, they fail to account for the 
diversity of public perceptions of comparable risks. The persistence of risk disputes has led to 
other lines of inquiry within the field of psychometrics (Nelkin, 1989, pp. 99-100). 
 
Psychometric studies of risk focus on factors that enter subjective risk perceptions and point 
to a concept of risk that is multidimensional and considerably more complex than the 
technical account. A key name in this direction is Paul Slovic. An important point in Slovic 
(1992) is that expert opinions on risk probabilities do not have much effect on laypeople’s 
attitudes and perceptions. But as with the technical approach, Slovic and his associates base 
their studies on a factual concept of risk, implying that there is a standard of real risk against 
which lay perceptions may be judged to be more or less accurate. This is epitomized in the 
field’s common use of the term perceived risk. The term connotes that natural sciences study 
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reality, while the factors discovered by the social sciences represent “mere perceptions” 
(Bradbury, 1989, p. 384). 
 
This has attracted another line of inquiry among sociologists who claim that such a distinction 
between “real” and “perceived” risk is misleading; experts’ and laypersons’ assessments of 
risk both constitute judgments and both are subject to bias. Specifically, these social scientists 
represent a particular branch of sociological risk studies closely affiliated with the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). Their starting point is that all risks – also those 
determined by scientists and risk experts – are a product of social processes (Lidskog & 
Sundqvist, 2012). Indeed, neither the technical nor the psychometric approach manages to 
account for variations in the perception of comparable risks in different social, cultural, or 
international contexts. 
 
Not to say that technical or the psychometric views on risk are obsolete, but they represent 
just parts of society and culture at large. Herein lies the essential contribution of STS to 
sociological risk studies. According to Göran Sundqvist (2002, p. 29), what often is lacking in 
sociological studies, but which is at the forefront of STS, is an interest in the knowledge 
involved. Too often the knowledge of experts is not disputed. STS practitioners contend that 
the role of science and technical risk analysis is a relevant topic for sociological studies, 
although not something that should be used as final results by which to judge other people’s 
knowledge claims. “Knowledge is not made up of simple reflections of self-evident states of 
the world; the world always has to be interpreted by humans using cultural resources as 
concepts, classifications and previous experience as horizons of expectation, which strongly 
influence the outcome of knowledge production. It is therefore possible to construct different 
knowledges about the ‘same’ object” (ibid. pp. 29-30). The important task for STS is, 
therefore, to explain how such variations in knowledge come about. In connection with risk 
studies, then, this means we should focus on variations in risk assessments – including risk 
perceptions – so as to identify the underlying value premises that shape individual 
interpretation of the particular phenomena of investigation. Such is indeed the guiding 
principle behind the composition of this study. 
 
2.2 Science and politics 
The relationship between science and policy has received much attention from STS 
researchers “because it serves in such an obvious way as a test field for studying the mutual 
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influence of science and policy” (Sundqvist, 2002, p. 30). According to the American 
sociologist and STS researcher Dorothy Nelkin (1979, p. 16), an important fact enabling 
social values to influence the judgments made by technical experts, is that scientific data are 
characterized by uncertainties. The persistent uncertainties compound the difficulties of risk 
assessment and leave considerable scope for subjective factors to enter both scientific 
interpretations and public perceptions: while debates among scientists reflect the biased 
selection of scientific evidence based on individual value premises, public debates over 
science and technology reflect the selective use of technical expertise as a means for 
defending the legitimacy of policy decisions. In this way, technical knowledge becomes a 
resource exploited by all parties to justify their particular political and moral views. 
 
Scientific uncertainties prevail at several levels, making risk assessment a complicated field 
of practice. For often, while an accident could be catastrophic, the chances of one are small 
and difficult to calculate. In other cases, the extent of risk may remain unclear due to 
inadequate evidence or complicated correlations, such as when health effects do not become 
evident for many years or when different people are affected in different ways. Even when the 
risks are known, they must be weighed against the potential benefits; in such cases dispute 
focuses on balancing competing priorities in decisions about regulation. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that specialists assessing risk arrive at divergent conclusions about the level 
of danger and the need for regulatory controls (Nelkin, 1989, pp. 97-98). 
 
According to Nelkin, when scientific data are used in regulation and various judicial 
processes, different parties try to exploit the uncertainties for their own purposes. Technical 
expertise becomes a crucial political resource in conflicts over science and technology, “for 
access to knowledge and the resulting ability to question the data used to legitimize decisions 
is an essential bias of power and influence”. In this way, the technical expert “is reduced to 
one more weapon in a political arsenal” (Nelkin, 1979, pp. 15-16).  
  
However, as asserted by Göran Sundqvist (2002, p. 34), Nelkin shows a normative tendency 
in her analysis when, for instance, claiming that “the technical nature of the debates often 
tends to obscure their underlying political dimensions” (Nelkin, 1979, p. 24). Sundqvist 
interprets Nelkin’s position as one where it is important to sort out what is science and what is 
policy; but how will we be able to measure the degree of scientific relevance against the 
degree of political or social influence? Such a task “is both inconvenient and hard to manage,” 
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Sundqvist asserts, “as it ends up in a normative position of judging the legitimate power of 
different spheres” (Sundqvist, 2002, p. 35). In his opinion, the best way for academic 
researchers to handle such questions is “by adopting an analytically impartial and empirically 
based strategy, analyzing the attitudes of the scrutinized actors” (ibid. p. 32). Drawing on the 
work of Sheila Jasanoff, Sundqvist describes how a positivistic view of defining science as 
independent of social values works to uphold the authority of the scientist. Thus, rather than 
using clear-cut demarcations between facts and values, Sundqvist argues that the positivistic 
viewpoint more accurately may be analyzed as a professional strategy, adopted by scientists 
and affiliated agents so as to raise their own credibility (ibid. pp. 37-38). 
 
In short: the evaluation of risk engages a variety of institutions, activities and actors that differ 
in their objectives and practices, and to properly label these activities and people, for example 
as regulatory science or as scientific expertise, is an important task. Professional self-interests 
(not only among scientists, but among all those involved in the risk evaluation process), in 
combination with other types of interests (political, economic, social), work to influence 
individual perception and assessment of risk, causing discord regarding the appropriate policy 
proceedings. Such an “interests explanation”, as Sundqvist calls it, has been a popular 
analytic approach among several STS researchers, and it is also, as Sundqvist acknowledges, 
prominent in Nelkin’s work, despite her tendency to favour the accusation of “obscure” 
technical knowledge (Sundqvist, 2002, p. 41). An interests approach to explaining the 
variations among the Nordic crisis responses is the main methodical outset of this study. 
  
2.3 Cultural Theory 
The anthropologist Mary Douglas is the main influence in what can be seen as the culturalist 
approach to risk. Douglas claims that concerns about risk may depend less on the nature of 
the actual danger than on political, economic, or cultural biases – that is, the pattern in which 
shared values are arranged. Not all dangers are recognized as risks; to become a risk, a danger 
must be culturally perceived and selected as such. Thus, the selection of dangers and the 
choice of social organization run hand in hand. It is the social incorporation (group) and the 
degree of societal regulation (grid) that shape the perceptions of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982). 
 
It was in Natural Symbols (1970) that Douglas first introduced her now widely known group-
grid model, which later gave rise to the broadly labeled research tradition Cultural Theory 
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(c.f. Thompson et al., 1990). The theory is wide-ranging and aims to provide a dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between individual risk perception, social organization, and 
political ideology. This thesis, however, shall not greatly concern itself with the overarching 
premises of civilization or ideology, but will focus on the particular diplomatic cultures of the 
respective embassies in relation to their local Japanese surroundings. Here I shall briefly 
review only those aspects of the theory that are applicable in my analysis.	  
 
The group-grid model is based on a two-dimensional typology, but the dimensions are far 
from simplistic: The (social) group dimension indicates the degree of social incorporation of 
any individual, measured by the amount of social interaction, the interconnectedness of 
networks, and the strength of group boundaries. The (regulation) grid dimension covers the 
amount and strength of rules and classifications that regulate individual options and social 
interaction. Put the two dimensions together, group and grid, and you get four contrasting 
types of social control that make up the grid-group cultural typology: Briefly put, high 
grid/high group produce positional hierarchies, high grid/low group produce isolates or 
fatalism, low grid/high group produce enclave communities and egalitarianism, and low 
grid/low group produce competitive individualists and markets. In this way, mechanisms of 
grid and group allow for several combinations, although still caught within the framework of 
the model (Douglas, 2006, pp. 2-6). 
 
This presents the first rudimentary version of grid and group whereby analysis essentially is 
limited to a static mapping of cultures. It was Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky 
(1990) that eventually transformed the model into a more dynamic theoretical system 
(Cultural Theory) by introducing interaction between cultures. They showed that any 
community consists of several cultures, and that each culture defines itself by contrast to the 
others, steadied and reinforced by supporting institutions (Douglas, 2006, pp. 8-10). 
 
Cultural Theory is based on the idea that all cultures are inherently opposed to one another 
and represent incompatible forms of social organization. In order for existing cultures to 
endure, it is essential that each one believe the others are fundamentally immoral (Douglas, 
2006, pp. 8-9). However, the idea of incessant competition and “irreconcilable conflict” 
between different cultural platforms becomes hard to justify when studying processes of 
exchange and assimilation in today’s multicultural societies. Such cases are more readily 
understood by using the group/grid dimensions as “independently variable yet mutually 
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interdependent factors” (Geertz 1973, quoted in Haukelid, 1999, p. 32). 
 
Without much regard for some of the more rigid stipulations of Cultural Theory, then, its 
conceptual framework has proven a useful reference in this comparative study of risk 
perception. As stated by Thompson: “The cultural bias approach is essentially a comparative 
method for taking account of differences between nations in terms of their differing patterns 
of cultural divergence” (Thompson, 1986, p. 123). In this way, Cultural Theory allows for 
variation in risk perception, not only in terms of cultural differences (in the sense of national 
culture), but also on account that different people may bias a certain culture in different 
directions. “Its concern is not with those gross cultural differences between countries, but 
more with those differences that are to be found within them. (…) For as well as cultural 
convergence, there is cultural divergence.” (ibid. p. 123). Thus, the stage is set for a thorough 
investigation of the different risk managements among such (seemingly) culturally akin 
communities as the Nordic embassies in Tokyo. Moreover, the embassies representing foreign 
authorities in a local Japanese context, adds to the case an interesting angle of intercultural 
association. 
 
2.4 Theory as applied to the case 
Before we move on to the main body of this case study, I shall go over certain aspects 
peculiar to the case in order to substantiate the particular selection of theoretical frameworks. 
I feel this can be done most effectively by thoroughly defining (1) the specific type of risk 
being studied, (2) the context in which it is perceived, and (3) the method by which the 
specific type of risk in its specific context most suitably may be analyzed: 
 
(1) The type of risk being studied in this thesis is nuclear risk, or more specifically, the risks 
of low-dose radiation. Characteristic of this type of risk is the considerable uncertainty that 
prevails over the health effects of exposure. In Risk Society (1992) Ulrich Beck describes the 
risks of modern civilization. Modern risks are man-made, universal, future-oriented, and 
knowledge dependent; they require the “sensory organs” of science in order to become visible 
or interpretable as hazards at all (Beck, 1992, p. 27). Indeed, Beck’s description is highly 
applicable to the topic of nuclear risk. Since we cannot see, smell or in any way sense low-
dose radiation, our knowledge of its possible dangerous effects is based not on experience, 
but on mediated knowledge occurring through scientific expertise. This leaves plenty of 
opportunity for various interpretations to manifest over the risks of radiation exposure. 
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(2) The context in which this nuclear risk is discussed is in connection with a large-scale and 
unforeseen nuclear accident. In sociological studies nuclear risk has typically been discussed 
in relation to public controversies over the siting of a nuclear waste disposal or regarding the 
regulation of appropriate exposure levels for the workers at a nuclear plant, etc. This study, 
however, deals with nuclear risk and nuclear regulation after the hazard is a fact. Thus, the 
issue is not so much about traditional risk regulation as it is about crisis management. This 
particular situation offers an interesting angle, because what is often the case in controversies 
over technology or regulation is that the authorities push for technological advancement while 
the public resists and is more skeptical to the dangers. But in the case of the Nordic responses 
to the Fukushima nuclear crisis, circumstances have been quite the opposite. It seems that the 
Nordic governments have advised higher precaution than what many of their citizens living in 
Japan felt was necessary. In this way, the Nordic embassies’ local presence within Japanese 
society provides important insight to the different understandings and assessments of the 
situation. 
 
3) Based on the above two provisions, my methodical outset shall be to use Nelkin’s interest 
approach to explain differences in risk assessment, and Douglas’ cultural analysis to explain 
differences in risk assessment within the same interest group. Given the basic objective of this 
study to uncover the underlying interests that have shaped the Nordic crisis responses, 
Nelkin’s interest approach is easily justified. Yet at the same time, the particular context in 
which the risk is evaluated necessitates an approach that not only accounts for different roles 
and interests, but also accounts for different situational settings and cultural frameworks; not 
only are we investigating the political interests at play at the governmental level, we are also 
(if not mainly) studying the particular embassy perspective of representing a foreign 
government’s interests from within a Japanese society in crisis. Having reached the point 
where we understand how risks are handled differently by different institutions and 
individuals, we need to turn to Douglas’ cultural analysis to tell us why; for even coinciding 
roles and interests (as with the embassy and its ministry) may produce differing risk 
evaluations. As Thompson argues: “Even a cursory international comparison will reveal that 
the same risks get handled differently in different countries, that there are different 
institutionalized styles of risk-handling. But institutions are not just there; they have to be 
legitimated. (…) An adequate theory of risk-handling style (…) will have to go below the 
institutional level and take account of socially induced variations in individual perceptions of 
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risk and in individual strategies toward risk” (Thompson, 1986, p. 122). Thus, it is my 
contention that Nelkin’s interest explanation and Douglas’ cultural analysis work well in 
combination. Or in other words, by combining STS methodology with sociological theories of 
risk, an empirically sensitive and enhanced understanding of different risk perceptions can be 
achieved. 
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3. The Norwegian response 
This chapter addresses the first research question: In connection with the Fukushima nuclear 
crisis, how has the Norwegian Embassy responded to the situation, and what considerations 
and interests have influenced this crisis response? The official course of action and the 
various dealings of the Norwegian Embassy shall be mapped out, and along the way, 
considerations and interests that have factored into the Norwegian crisis management shall be 
identified. However, the findings shall not immediately be fully interpreted within an 
analytical framework. The bulk of analysis shall be reserved for the overall comparison of the 
Nordic responses (Chapter 5 and 6). 
 
3.1 Response organization 
The emergency preparedness system in Norway is regulated according to the so-called sector 
responsibility principle whereby each designated organization is in charge of emergency 
planning and dealing with emergencies in the domain for which they are ordinarily 
responsible. The ministry that is most affected is appointed executive ministry and will 
supervise the crisis response, assisted by other affected governmental offices (Ministry of 
Justice and the Police, Norway, 2001). Consequently, as the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) commonly is responsible for assisting citizens in crisis situations abroad, it 
became executive coordinator of the Norwegian emergency response to the Great East Japan 
Crisis. 
 
The Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo is part of the MFA organization and follows Ministry 
jurisdiction. While the MFA administers the general crisis management from Oslo, the 
Embassy deals with the situation at the local level. According to the general contingency 
plans, in the event of natural disaster the Embassy’s main tasks include providing an overview 
of affected Norwegians, assisting Norwegians in the need of help, informing on the situation 
and appropriate security precautions, and coordinating assistance from Norwegian authorities 
and organizations. If need be, the MFA shall sufficiently supply the Embassy with additional 
personnel and technical equipment so that the disaster may be handled in an efficient manner 
(Fjell, 2007, pp. 80-81). 
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In addition, special expertise is made available when dealing with nuclear incidents. The 
Royal Decree of 17 February 2006 establishes a separate nuclear accident preparedness 
organization in order to ensure the rapid implementation of protective measures. The 
organization is built up around the Crisis Committee for Nuclear Preparedness, made up of 
representatives from several governmental offices such as the Norwegian Radiation 
Protection Authority, the Ministry of Defense, the Norwegian Directorate of Health, the 
Norwegian Food Safety Authority, the National Police Directorate, and the Directorate for 
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
(NRPA) is head of the Crisis Committee and is required to provide the Committee with 
scientific expertise, obtaining information, situation assessment, measurement results, etc. 
The NRPA maintains round-the-clock alertness and is the contact point for the national and 
international warning agreements (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 2010). 
 
And so it was that the Norwegian emergency response to the crisis in Japan was mobilized in 
keeping with protocol. The same day as the crisis struck (March 11) the MFA established its 
emergency staff, as did the Crisis Committee the following day. The two teams collaborated 
closely, and on the morning of March 14, they decided to send an emergency unit from Oslo 
to Tokyo in order to evaluate the situation on-site and reinforce the efforts of the Norwegian 
Embassy (which in the meantime had been hard at work in establishing its own emergency 
management) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2011). The emergency unit was made up 
of 3 MFA officials, 2 from the NRPA, 3 from the Police Directorate, and 2 from the 
Directorate of Health (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 2011). The unit departed 
Norway on March 15, later reducing its presence in Japan as of March 21 (Norwegian 
Radiation Protection Authority, 2011). In addition, shortly after the earthquake and tsunami 
disaster was a fact, the Embassy received provisional reinforcements from the Norwegian 
diplomatic missions in Shanghai and Beijing, arriving within days of the initial outbreak to 
alleviate the workload on the Embassy staff (Dagbladet, 2011). 
 
3.2 Actions and recommendations 
As we recall from the introductory chapter, the topics of investigation in this study of the 
Norwegian crisis response can be sorted into two main categories: official security directives 
to Norwegian citizens (i.e. travel advice, recommendations concerning potassium iodide 
tablets, and the arrangement of special flights back to Norway), and the Norwegian 
Embassy’s own security precautions (i.e. the relocation of Embassy operations and the 
23	  
management of Embassy personnel). The next two subsections deal with these two categories 
respectively. 
 
3.2.1 Official security directives to citizens 
Official travel advice is typically issued whenever the MFA wishes to recommend that 
Norwegian citizens avoid or consider the risk of travelling to a particular area or region due to 
dangerous or unstable circumstances. Such official advice may recommend that citizens avoid 
“all travel” or “non-essential travel” to a country or region and, in some cases, that they leave 
that country or region. It may also include information regarding personal safety measures. As 
a rule, it is the MFA that issues the travel advice, revising it according to continual 
assessment of the situation’s progression. Although the Ministry can encourage people to 
follow its recommendations, ultimately the decision to travel is the sole responsibility of the 
individual (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2009). Nevertheless, travelling to a country 
against the Ministry’s advice may still have certain economic and legal implications regarding 
insurance coverage. In this way, in addition to personal predicament, the official travel advice 
may also greatly influence company dealings and business at large in the affected area. 
 
As mentioned, the official travel advice is formulated by the MFA, but there are typically 
several parties involved in the process. With regard to the crisis in Japan, the MFA has relied 
heavily on counsel from the Crisis Committee and in particular the scientific expertise 
provided by the NRPA. The Embassy in Tokyo is also involved, keeping the MFA at home 
informed on the movements of other embassies and Japanese authorities. However, the 
Ambassador emphasizes that the Embassy only plays a secondary part in the actual 
conception of the recommendations; although the Embassy is largely involved in the 
deliberation process, the final decision is made by the Ministry. 
 
Table 1 on page 25 shows a complete overview of the Norwegian travel advice for Japan 
since March 11. The information has been compiled from the MFA’s website along the way 
as the updates have been issued, and the original wording of the advice has been kept as far as 
possible. In total there have been eight postings, most of which were issued within the first 
month after the outbreak, when details and prospects on the nuclear situation still were very 
unclear. The initial recommendation of March 12 however, was not so much rooted in the 
nuclear threat as it was on the general damage to infrastructure resulting from the earthquake 
and tsunami, and Norwegians were advised against non-essential travel to the hardest hit areas 
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in the Tohoku region. The subsequent updates were largely based on the situation at the 
Fukushima power plants and on the risk of radiation exposure. On March 15 the initial 
precaution was drastically escalated as the Ministry discouraged all travel to Japan as well as 
residence therein. The next update on March 17 expanded on the previous posting, adding that 
Norwegians within 80 km of the Fukushima power plant should leave and specifically 
advising those in the northeastern parts of Japan, including Tokyo, to consider leaving. As 
stated in the notification, this update was issued in accordance with the travel 
recommendations of the other Nordic countries. On March 20 the Ministry repeated the 
previous posting, but left out the part discouraging travel to Japan overall, only to add it once 
again on April 1, although this time specifying that it only applied to non-essential travel. On 
April 13 however, the overall restriction on travel to Japan was removed once and for all, and 
in addition to the existing 80 km zone, a 150 km zone was introduced: non-essential travel to 
the area between 80 and 150 km from the Fukushima power plant, as well as residence 
therein, was discouraged. The latest update on June 16, still valid as of October 2011, upholds 
the 80 km zone around the power plant (without the 150 km zone): all travel to the zone is 
discouraged and citizens within are encouraged to leave. 
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Table 1: Overview of Norwegian travel advice for Japan as of March 11 2011 
  Basic recommendation 
 
Additional information 
 
12/03 
 
The MFA advises against all travel that is not strictly 
necessary, to the Japanese areas hardest hit by the 
March 11 earthquake and tsunami in the Tohoku 
region. 
 
 
Travellers to Japan should be aware of the possibility 
of delays and changes in public transportations and 
should act in accordance with current 
recommendations from local Japanese authorities. 
 
 
13/03 
 
The MFA advises against all travel that is not strictly 
necessary, to the Japanese areas hardest hit by the 
March 11 earthquake and tsunami in the Miyagi, 
Iwate, Aomori, Akita, Yamagata, Tochigi, Ibaraki 
and Fukushima prefectures northeast of Tokyo. 
 
 
Travellers to Japan should be aware of the possibility 
of delays and changes in public transportations and 
should act in accordance with current 
recommendations from local Japanese authorities. 
 
 
15/03 
 
The MFA advises against travel to or residence in 
Japan. 
 
 
The advice is in connection with the unresolved 
situation at the nuclear power plants. Norwegian 
citizens are encouraged to follow recommendations 
from local authorities and see updated information on 
the website of the Embassy in Tokyo. 
 
 
17/03 
 
The MFA advises against travel to or residence in 
Japan. Norwegians staying less than 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant are encouraged to leave the 
area. Norwegians staying in the Tohoku, Chubu, and 
Kanto regions should consider leaving the area. This 
includes Norwegians in Tokyo, which is a part of the 
Kanto region. 
 
 
The advice is connected to the unresolved situation at 
the nuclear power plants and the possibility of further 
deterioration. The recommendation is in accordance 
with the advice of other Nordic countries and is made 
upon counsel with the NRPA. Norwegian citizens are 
encouraged to follow recommendations from local 
authorities and see updated information on the 
website of the Embassy in Tokyo. 
 
 
18/03 
 
The MFA sets up special flights from Japan to 
Norway departing 19/03. 
 
 
The flights are not part of an evacuation, just an offer 
to citizens who want to leave. 
 
20/03 
 
Norwegians staying less than 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant are encouraged to leave the 
area. Norwegians staying in the Tohoku, Chubu, and 
Kanto regions should consider leaving the area. This 
includes Norwegians in Tokyo, which is a part of the 
Kanto region. 
 
 
The advice is connected to the unresolved situation at 
the nuclear power plants and the possibility of further 
deterioration. Norwegian citizens are encouraged to 
follow recommendations from Japanese authorities 
and see updated information on the Embassy’s 
website. 
 
 
20/03 
 
Potassium iodide tablets are made available to 
Norwegians in Japan. 
 
 
The tablets are only to be taken upon instruction from 
Japanese or Norwegian authorities. 
 
 
01/04 
 
The MFA advises against travel to or residence in 
Japan that is not strictly necessary. Norwegians 
staying less than 80 km from the Fukushima power 
plant are encouraged to leave the area, while 
Norwegians staying in the Tohoku, Chubu, and Kanto 
regions (including Tokyo) should consider leaving 
the area. 
 
 
The advice is connected to the uncertainty of the 
development at the nuclear power plant. Norwegian 
citizens are encouraged to follow recommendations 
from Japanese authorities and see updated 
information on the Embassy’s website. 
 
 
 
13/04 
 
The MFA advises against travel to or residence in the 
area between 80 and 150 km from the nuclear power 
plants in the Fukushima area, that is not strictly 
necessary. Norwegians staying less than 80 km from 
the nuclear power plants in the Fukushima area are 
encouraged to leave the area. 
 
 
Norwegian citizens are encouraged to follow 
recommendations from Japanese authorities and see 
updated information on the Embassy’s website. 
 
 
16/06 
 
The MFA advises against all travel to or residence in 
the area within 80 km from the nuclear power plant 
Fukushima Dai-ichi, and encourages all Norwegian 
citizens to leave the area. 
 
Norwegian citizens are encouraged to follow 
recommendations from Japanese authorities and see 
updated information on the Embassy’s website. 
 
 
16/06 
 
 
Potassium iodide tablets are no longer deemed 
necessary and will not be distributed anymore. 
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Also included in the Table 1 overview, although not strictly counted as official travel advice, 
are other types of Ministry recommendations relating to the security situation in Japan. These 
concern the transportation of citizens back to Norway on specially arranged flights and the 
distribution of potassium iodide as a preventative measure against radiation poisoning. In 
Table 1 these directives are indicated in the shaded areas. 
 
Regarding the special flight arrangements: On March 18, following the March 17 travel 
advice heightening the alert on Tokyo, the Ministry announced that it would arrange two 
special flights as a service to bring home those Norwegians that wanted to leave. The flights 
would depart from Japan (Tokyo and Osaka) on March 19. The Ministry was mindful to point 
out that it was not planning an “evacuation” of Norwegian citizens, but rather contributing 
towards helping them leave if they so chose. The special flight arrangements were being 
offered because commercial flights out of Japan reportedly were filling up, making it 
increasingly difficult to leave the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2011). 
 
On the subject of potassium iodide: Accompanying the updated travel advice on March 20, 
the Ministry announced that the Crisis Committee had decided to make potassium iodide 
tablets available to Norwegian citizens living in Japan. Potassium iodide is a common 
precaution implemented in the event of a radioactive release, as it may prevent the 
development of thyroid cancer caused by radioactive iodine, which is one of the most 
common nuclear fission products. The body absorbs iodine rather quickly and stores it in the 
thyroid gland, but by saturating the body with a source of stable iodine (iodide tablets) prior 
to exposure or shortly thereafter, the uptake of radioactive iodine can be blocked. According 
to the NRPA, side effects of taking iodide tablets are rare, usually mild and short-lived, and 
may involve symptoms such as a metallic taste in the mouth, nausea or abdominal pain 
(Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 2011). 
 
In the notification of March 20, the Ministry stated that the iodide tablets could be obtained 
by contacting the Norwegian Embassy, adding that Norwegians travelling to Japan (despite 
official recommendations not to) should bring along potassium iodide obtained from the 
Norwegian Directorate of Health in advance. The Ministry did not, however, recommend 
immediate intake, stressing that the iodide tablets only should be taken upon specific 
instruction from Japanese or Norwegian authorities in the event that the nuclear situation 
should worsen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2011). As it turned out, such 
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instructions never ensued, and as of June 16 the NRPA announced that potassium iodide 
would not be distributed anymore, as it no longer was deemed necessary. 
 
3.2.2 The Embassy’s own security measures 
As for the Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo, it too was affected by the travel advice that was 
issued. In dealing with the crisis, the Embassy had to ensure the safety and wellbeing of its 
staff and implemented certain security measures along the way. 
 
In the early stage of the crisis, the Norwegian delegates were given the opportunity to go back 
to Norway with their families on special leave. This arrangement, however, did not have any 
basis in the Ministry’s travel advice or the security situation in Japan. Rather, it was 
established as a part of the MFA’s employer liability to its staff, purely in the event that they 
should feel overworked or in any way troubled by the situation. Of the seven permanent 
delegates to the Embassy, five chose to take leave at one point or another. Two remained with 
the Embassy, one of which was the Ambassador. 
 
In addition, consistent with the travel advice of March 17 recommending that Norwegians in 
Tokyo should consider leaving the region, the Embassy staff in Tokyo was temporarily 
moved to Kobe. The Ministry announced that the decision was made in accordance with the 
updated travel advice, and also with consideration to the MFA’s employer liability to its 
personnel. The move was a security precaution, based on the uncertain situation with regard 
to the nuclear emissions from the power plants in Northern Japan; a change in wind direction 
could bring emissions to Tokyo. Kobe, located 430 kilometres southwest of Tokyo, is 
therefore farther away from the power plants in Northern Japan. The Ministry added that the 
Embassy would “continue to be available for inquiries from the public, but a somewhat 
reduced level of service must be expected” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2011). 
 
In this connection, the particular phrasing of the “temporary movement of personnel from the 
Embassy in Tokyo to Kobe” is worthy of note. The Ministry does not refer to the move as a 
relocation of the Embassy, or even a relocation of operations. And exactly what a “reduced 
level of service” entails is not made clear in the notification. For all intents and purposes, 
seeing as the reception desk was empty and the front gates locked, Embassy operations in 
Tokyo might as well have shut down. Yet the Ambassador denies that the Embassy in Tokyo 
ever closed: “It was not the Embassy that moved; it stayed here, but there were Embassy 
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employees that temporarily moved to Kobe to run Embassy operations from there. So we did 
not move the establishment, because we still have target groups here (in Tokyo), and while 
we were in Kobe, I was for example in Tokyo several times to attend meetings, etc.” It may 
seem as though the Ambassador is reluctant to convey that the Embassy ever abandoned its 
audience in Tokyo – Tokyo is after all where the majority of Norwegians in Japan live. As 
one of the Embassy affiliates pointed out when I mistakenly referred to the movement of 
personnel as a relocation of the Embassy: “There is a huge difference between the two 
phrasings because it involves that he (the Ambassador) doesn’t end up with his embassy on 
Gaimusho’s (the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s) list of embassies that have moved out.” 
Arguably, the social stigma of being listed among other “fly-jin” embassies was something 
the Ambassador wished to avoid. Yet again, then, public reputation appears to be an 
important concern in the Embassy’s strategy. 
 
While the Norwegian delegates were required to participate in the move to Kobe, the locally 
employed Japanese personnel were given the option to remain in Tokyo and work from home 
if they so wished, commuting to Kobe only for shorter shifts of a few days. As it turned out, 
none of the Japanese employees chose to join the Norwegian delegates in Kobe on a fulltime 
basis. The Embassy staff left Tokyo on March 22 and set up provisional operations at their 
Honorary Consulate General in Kobe, holding office space within the premises of the 
Norwegian classification company Det Norske Veritas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 
2011). Here it was that the Embassy leased workspace for approximately four weeks, up until 
April 15. The move back to Tokyo was reportedly due to the subtraction of the travel 
restrictions on the capital as of April 13 (The Norwegian Embassy, Tokyo, 2011). 
 
3.3 Closer on the Embassy 
So far we have covered the basic security directives and actions that have been implemented 
by the Norwegian government in response to the nuclear crisis. We have also identified the 
various parties that are involved in establishing these safety measures. In the process, 
however, we have touched upon some instances that reveal a certain discrepancy between the 
Embassy’s official stance and its actual dealings. The next three subsections shall take a 
closer look at the individual attitudes and conflicting interests within the Embassy’s setup. 
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3.3.1 The Embassy opinion 
In view of the fact that the Embassy is the Ministry’s official representative abroad and also 
responsible for conveying the official recommendations to Norwegian residents of Japan, it is 
reasonable that the Embassy attempt to follow the official recommendations in their own 
security precautions, as was demonstrated in the relocation of personnel to Kobe. Yet the 
official travel advice does specify “non essential” travel/residence. As the Ambassador 
explains, it is up to the individual to decide what constitutes as “essential” and “non-essential” 
travel, and he provides a hypothetical example: “A journalist covering a revolution for 
example, he would also follow the travel advice, but it would be essential travel for him to 
perform his job.” On this account, one could easily argue that the Embassy had a duty to 
remain in Tokyo especially considering the crisis at hand; it is exactly such an emergency 
situation that requires the Embassy to be fully operational and available to its citizens, who 
for the most part reside in Tokyo. Along these lines, in the process of determining what 
considerations that have shaped the Embassy’s response to the crisis, it would be interesting 
to know exactly who initiated the relocation to Kobe: was it the Ministry or the Embassy? 
Officially it is the Ministry’s decision, but surely the Embassy had certain views on the issue 
considering the fact that it directly affected Embassy operations and would involve a 
considerable upheaval of the organization. Earlier in the document we already established that 
the Embassy does take part in the deliberation process concerning updates to the travel 
recommendations, but we do not know if there have been any diverging opinions along the 
way. 
 
When interviewing the Ambassador, he upholds that the Embassy fully supports the 
Ministry’s judgments, furthermore maintaining an official and collective stance even when 
asked of his personal opinion: “We are an instrument of the government, its extended arm 
abroad. We agree with the travel advice that has been issued.” Clearly the Ambassador does 
not wish to reveal any discrepancies between official and personal points of view. However, 
of the other two Embassy associates that were inquired, namely the IN and the NSEC 
representative (with whom we shall be further acquainted in the next section), more personal 
accounts are imparted: Both of them feel that the move to Kobe was unnecessary and that the 
official travel advice was too restrictive in certain respects, especially with reference to the 
recommendation against staying in Tokyo and travelling to Japan overall. One of them points 
out, however, that there almost always is some discrepancy between official and personal 
precaution because they are based on completely different principles; the consequences of 
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individual actions only affect the individual, whereas the authorities have to account for the 
population in general. 
 
3.3.2 The Embassy compound 
Regardless of the opinion within the Embassy itself, there is no question that the Embassy 
falls under MFA jurisdiction and must follow Ministry protocol. Yet the matter is not so clear 
when it comes to the other two Norwegian agencies that reside within the Embassy estate. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Embassy compound houses two other Norwegian State 
organizations: Innovation Norway and the Norwegian Seafood Export Council. Innovation 
Norway (IN) is the Norwegian government's official trade representative abroad. Generally 
speaking, the aim of the company is to assist Norwegian businesses in expanding into new 
markets, domestic as well as international (Innovation Norway, 2010). The Norwegian 
Seafood Export Council (NSEC) on the other hand, is the Norwegian seafood industry's 
combined marketing and information council. The goal of its operations is to increase the 
interest for and awareness of Norwegian seafood in Norway and the rest of the world 
(Norwegian Seafood Export Council, 2011). It is not uncommon for either corporation to 
have their abroad offices in close affiliation with the Norwegian embassies and consulates, as 
is the case in Tokyo. Nevertheless, both organizations are independent agencies with 
mandates of their own. Still, in the event of an emergency, they are a part of the Embassy’s 
emergency setup and included in the Embassy contingency plans; a “hybrid” part of the 
Embassy, so to speak. This puts the offices in a somewhat tricky position when determining 
their own crisis responses. 
 
Regarding IN’s response: When the crisis hit, the IN office in Tokyo received instructions 
from its headquarters in Norway to shut down operations and to follow the actions of the 
Embassy. Thus, a statement was issued on March 15 informing that the IN office in Tokyo 
would close down until further notice in accordance with the MFA’s advice not to travel to or 
reside in Japan (Innovation Norway, 2011). On March 23, another statement was issued: the 
IN office had been reopened, but would temporarily function from Kobe in collaboration with 
the Embassy (Innovation Norway, 2011). As was the case with the Embassy, the local IN 
employees were given the choice of going to Kobe or working from their Tokyo homes, all 
four of them choosing to work from home. The two Norwegian IN delegates were more 
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obligated to participate in the move, but stayed in Kobe only for shorter shifts, choosing to 
commute from Tokyo. 
 
According to the IN representative, in the weeks following the crisis outbreak he worked 
fulltime as a part of the Embassy’s crisis team. This did not pose a problem for IN operations, 
he explains, “partly because we feel it is our responsibility as partners in Team Norway, but 
also because it was natural seeing that IN’s activities basically were shut down during the first 
two weeks; we could not engage in business in such a situation”. 
 
The NSEC on the other hand, never formally shut down its operations in Tokyo, but tried to 
“maintain operations as best we could, without being office dependent”, as the NSEC 
representative explains. The Tokyo office consists of just one Norwegian delegate, in addition 
to one locally employed secretary. After the crisis hit, NSEC headquarters in Norway strongly 
encouraged both of them to relocate to safer areas. Whereas the local secretary chose to 
remain in Tokyo due to personal circumstances, the Norwegian office manager accepted the 
offer from headquarters for the sake of his wife and children and relocated with them to the 
NSEC’s Singapore office, staying there for approximately one and a half week’s time before 
returning to Tokyo. 
 
According to the NSEC representative, the decisions were made with no particular 
consideration of the Ministry’s travel recommendations and he never received any 
instructions from NSEC headquarters to follow Embassy conduct. Still, he admits that the 
NSEC office was greatly affected by the Embassy’s actions, especially with regard to the 
Kobe move: “The Embassy didn’t want any activity going on here, as that would have sent a 
bad signal. So the Embassy estate was practically out of bounds for any activity.” In addition, 
he felt a certain obligation to be a part of the move to Kobe, and for that reason he made a few 
trips back and forth. This, he felt, was his duty as part of the “Embassy family”. “We are a 
part of the family here, granted by the Ministry, and we take advantage of that for what it’s 
worth”, he explains as he reveals his double sided business card with the NSEC’s logo on one 
side and the Embassy’s on the other; “so in this sense there are certain responsibilities 
involved.” 
 
As demonstrated in the above, being a part of the “family” may blur the boundaries of duty 
and obligation. To a large extent the predicament can be explained by the fact that the 
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organizations have very different objectives: whereas the Embassy’s task is to look after the 
wellbeing of Norwegian citizens in Japan, the primary mission of both IN and the NSEC is 
essentially to look out for Norwegian corporate interests. The IN representative explains that 
“as representatives of business, we have our own views on such things as travel advice and 
the temporary relocation of the Embassy; views that may contradict those that only take into 
consideration the general security of Norwegians in Japan”. He claims that IN, together with 
the Chamber of Commerce, put quite a lot of pressure on the Ministry to change the travel 
advice and to move the Embassy back to Tokyo. The NSEC representative however, did not 
influence the travel advice much, although he believes he did have the opportunity. 
 
3.3.3 The Embassy science officer 
As mentioned in the introduction, in addition to his position as Counsellor to Innovation 
Norway, the IN representative also holds the title of Counsellor for Science and Technology 
to the Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo. Thus his role is twofold in the sense that he abides by 
both IN and the Embassy. This thesis refers to him using the two labels “IN representative” 
and “Embassy science officer” interchangeably according to context. 
 
The Embassy science officer has a doctorate degree (PhD) in chemical engineering in 
addition to five years of working experience within nuclear technology, one of which was 
spent at a Japanese nuclear power plant. This special knowledge within the nuclear sciences 
made him a valuable asset to the Embassy in dealing with the crisis, and in the weeks after the 
crisis outbreak his function was predominantly tied to Embassy affairs, assessing the nuclear 
situation from a scientific point of view and explaining the specifics to people with non-
technical backgrounds. Yet his position did not hold any formal authority over the travel 
recommendations. As the Ambassador maintains: “When it comes to decisions in terms of 
what we do, how we judge the situation, we must rely on the appointed expertise at home, 
which is the NRPA.” 
 
Be that as it may, the Embassy science officer worked in close cooperation with the two 
NRPA representatives sent from Oslo, and he also introduced them to his Nordic 
counterparts: the science officers from the Swedish and Finnish embassies, who like him hold 
special expertise within the nuclear sciences, and representatives from the Danish and 
Icelandic embassies. Based on his discussions with the other experts, he feels that “for the 
most part they feel the same way as I do; the limits that are set are extremely conservative – 
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not for the workers who are exposed to the radiation at the Fukushima facility, but for the 
population in general.” Specifically, he feels the recommendation to avoid all travel to Japan 
and to leave Tokyo was too restrictive. The 80-km zone around the Fukushima nuclear 
facilities on the other hand, he feels were reasonable. 
 
Seeing as there apparently was general consensus among the experts while in Japan, how 
come the NRPA in Oslo issued contrary recommendations? The Embassy science officer 
feels this has to do with the fact that there still exists considerable uncertainty around the 
actual dangers of radiation exposure. The NRPA can only ascertain that there exists some risk 
of yet another radioactive release, some chance that it might move in the direction of Tokyo, 
and some chance that it might have an effect on people’s health; but they cannot be very 
quantitative in their predictions, as there hardly exist any reliable studies on the subject. Thus, 
the MFA is given leeway to interpret the NRPA’s scientific assessment in a manner that best 
suits its own purpose; it is up to the MFA the determine the “appropriate” level of precaution 
in the face of uncertainty. In this connection the science counsellor points to the 2004 South 
Asian tsunami disaster as a contributing factor behind the MFA’s “overly cautious” response; 
the disaster affected numerous Norwegian tourists in the region and the MFA’s management 
of the incident was widely criticized, so this time around the Ministry has been extra keen on 
avoiding any criticism and has opted for a “better-safe-than-sorry” approach to the Fukushima 
situation. 
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4. The Japanese response 
Although the focus of this study is on the Nordic crisis responses, a brief review of the 
Japanese crisis response is necessary seeing as it was a central point of reference for the 
Nordic authorities in determining their strategy. Moreover, a certain appreciation of the 
Japanese environment in which the embassies operated shall prove useful in the approaching 
analysis (Chapter 6). 
 
“The Japanese community has been very disciplined and taken this with a composure I think 
you will not find anywhere else in the world”, the Norwegian Ambassador remarked. Indeed, 
the international media has marvelled at the notable lack of disorder immediately following 
the earthquake, with hardly any reports of rioting or large-scale disruptions. This has largely 
been attributed to culturally inherent qualities within the Japanese people: their “extraordinary 
stoicism” and “rigid conformity, obedience and sense of national purpose” (The Australian, 
2011). Yet, as this chapter sets out to demonstrate, we should be cautious in treating culture 
too autonomously. A main aim of this chapter is to discriminate between the Japanese crisis 
response and that of the Nordic governments, not on the basis of cultural generalizations, but 
on the basis of social and contextual factors within a cultural setting – thereby necessitating a 
more dynamic approach to explaining different understandings of risk. 
 
4.1 Japanese culture and context 
Overall, the Japanese security directives have been markedly less restrictive in comparison 
with the foreign directives. This is perhaps most evident in the evacuation zones around the 
Fukushima I power plant, where the Japanese authorities mainly have operated with a 20-km 
zone, later expanding its radius to 30 km. The 20-km mandatory evacuation zone was first set 
on March 12, then on March 15, residents within 20 and 30 km from the site were urged to 
stay indoors (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, Japan, 2011), and on March 25, residents 
in the 30-km circle were urged to evacuate as well (The Japan Times, 2011). Furthermore, on 
April 22, the Japanese government began evacuating people from certain areas outside the 
official exclusion zone (The Japan Times, 2011). 
 
Contrary to most foreign authorities, the Japanese government has not gone out with any 
“worst-case scenarios”, the Norwegian science officer explains. It rather seems the Japanese 
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government has chosen a strategy that involves communicating the current facts, but without 
including too much interpretation concerning the possible outcomes. Even so, the Norwegian 
science officer does not doubt that the data provided by the Japanese government is accurate. 
He also believes that the extent of the Japanese evacuation and safety zones is sufficient in 
protecting the population of the affected areas, at least according to the existing radiation 
levels. The Norwegian Ambassador too acknowledges that the Japanese government has 
provided information “in a very thorough and professional manner”, pointing out that so far 
the Japanese measurements have proven entirely consistent with those of the IAEA. The issue 
that sets the Japanese directives apart from the Norwegian directives, then, is not the basis of 
factual evidence, but the degree of safeguard in the event that the nuclear situation should 
worsen. 
 
In the NSEC representative’s opinion, Japanese people generally have a more “rational” 
approach to personal risk in comparison to Norwegians. This, he claims, is because most 
Norwegians in Japan have not gotten used to “the adjustment of mindset that you need to 
survive here”. Living in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, it is not 
surprising that Japanese people are accustomed to earthquakes and react differently from 
people who experience an earthquake for the very first time. This might well be the case as far 
as earthquakes and tsunamis go, but even in Japan – notwithstanding the nuclear bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki – major nuclear accidents are not exactly everyday occurrences. Yet 
even in this respect – regarding the nuclear threat, that is – the Japanese crisis response has 
displayed substantially less precaution than its foreign counterparts. Herein we may be lead to 
believe that Japanese people, in some way or another, are more willing to accept or withstand 
nuclear risk. Yet, is such a general supposition viable? 
 
Incidentally, Douglas specifically discusses the Japanese way of understanding risk, pointing 
out that there is no word for “risk” in the Japanese language. Douglas claims that the word 
“risk” as used in the English language has become a decorative flourish on the word “danger”. 
Without using the word “risk” the Japanese can discourse very precisely about “formal 
probability, technical limits of certainty, degrees of safety, and of course, about the most 
primitive idea of all, danger” (Douglas, 1994, pp. 39-40). Instead of abstracting a particular 
risk issue from its larger context, the Japanese formulate it so as to include its moral and 
political implications. On this account, Douglas believes Japan may provide promising 
grounds for studying risk-taking and risk-aversion in a cultural framework: “This must be a 
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uniquely privileged occasion for questioning European habits of thought in an international 
perspective” (ibid. p. 50). 
 
To this claim I would undoubtedly agree, however, Douglas becomes normative when 
suggesting that Japanese scholars hold the potential to “resolve various contradictions and 
anomalies in the risk debates in Europe” (ibid. p. 50). In this it is implied that Japanese 
understandings of risk may be used as a standard against which the accuracy of European risk 
assessments may be judged. “Is it possible that the Japanese have a cultural advantage in 
probabilistic thinking?” Douglas asks (ibid. p. 51). The reason for this, she postulates, would 
have to do with features intrinsic to Japanese culture; the systemic way of learning 
mathematics using an abacus, the reductive form of literacy based on ideogrammatic 
characters, and the ancient form of hierarchal society. Based on these three idiosyncrasies, 
Douglas makes the all-embracing assumption that probabilistic reasoning (understood as 
“rational” reasoning) would come more easily to Japanese people than to Europeans (ibid. pp. 
52-53). 
 
Yet, to the best of my knowledge, Japanese people are not exempt from phobias such as fear 
of flying – despite the fact that “probabilistic” reasoning deems it safe. Notwithstanding the 
decidedly positivistic inference, Douglas’ assumption displays a gross generalization of 
Japanese risk interpretation void of any context or social interaction. Ironically, Douglas falls 
foul of her own notions by abstracting the concept of risk from its value-embedded 
environment. That is to say, while she takes into account Japanese culture at large, she 
crucially neglects the specific situational and circumstantial context embedded in all 
conceptions of reality. 
 
Accordingly, the way the Japanese authorities have handled the nuclear crisis, and the fact 
that the Japanese management demonstrated lower precaution than foreign managements, is 
inherently tied to the specific situational and circumstantial context. First, we must bear in 
mind that the Japanese government is in an exceptionally compromising position. The 
Japanese government is inevitably being held responsible for the nuclear dimensions of the 
crisis and must instigate counteractive measures while at the same time having to justify its 
nuclear policies. Moreover, the Japanese government is under several practical constraints 
relating to capacity, funding, panic prevention, etc. More importantly perhaps, under no 
circumstances can the Japanese government suggest that the entirety of its populace flee the 
37	  
country. In fact, in an interview with former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan (he resigned 
in August after widespread criticism of his crisis management), he disclosed that in a worst-
case scenario 30 million residents in the Tokyo metropolitan area would have had to be 
evacuated to other parts of the country, but that in reality, such a large-scale evacuation would 
have been practicably impossible (The Japan Times, 2011). In contrast, foreign governments 
are in a position where they can ask their citizens to leave Japan without it imposing major 
financial or logistical challenges. As stated by the Norwegian science officer: “With the 
Norwegian Embassy being responsible for only a limited number of individuals, it is 
relatively unproblematic to implement travel advice recommending that 20, 30, 40 people 
leave Tokyo or even the country. To ask 30, 40 million to do the same is a completely 
different story”. This basic difference in circumstances is a seminal factor distinguishing the 
expatriate’s perception of risk from that of the Japanese people.  
 
Thus, a comparison between the Japanese crisis response and the Norwegian crisis response, 
for instance, would not be well founded, because under the given circumstances Japan and 
Norway have completely different outsets. Such a study would have an unsymmetrical basis 
of investigation. Accordingly, this thesis shall focus on a symmetrical comparison among the 
Nordic crisis responses. Nevertheless, Japanese culture is highly relevant to this study of the 
Nordic responses because it is in a Japanese context that the diplomats resided and 
experienced the crisis situation. As we shall see, this has had an important impact on the way 
the Nordic diplomats perceived and evaluated the situation. 
 
Now that we have established the appropriate conditions for a legitimate cross-cultural 
comparison, what can explain the different crisis responses among governments with 
equivalent circumstantial outsets, perhaps even – more or less – equivalent national cultures? 
As stated by the science counsellor: “one would assume that the vast majority, at least people 
with similar cultural backgrounds such as Europeans, would react in similar ways to one 
another.” But as the following chapter will show, this has not been the case even among the 
Nordic countries. 
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5. The Nordic responses 
The objective of this chapter is to examine each of the Nordic crisis responses and see how 
the different managements measure up to one another. To begin with, the Swedish, Finnish 
and Danish crisis responses shall be reviewed individually. Subsequently, the responses shall 
be analyzed collectively within a comparative framework. Thus, this chapter embarks on the 
central analysis of the study and sets the stage for the overall theoretical interpretation to be 
carried out in the next chapter (Chapter 6). 
 
5.1 Sweden 
The Swedish travel recommendations have been seven in total. The initial recommendation 
on March 13 advised against non-essential travel to the hardest hit areas in the Tohoku region. 
On March 15 the areas were expanded to northeastern Japan at large, including Tokyo. The 
very next day however, the warning was severely increased: the March 16 posting advised 
against travel to Japan on the whole and also introduced the 80 km zone around the 
Fukushima power plant urging Swedes within the zone to leave. On March 20 further 
information was added specifying that the Swedish authorities could not rule out the 
possibility of a nuclear release having effects as far as 250 km away from Fukushima (thus 
also affecting Tokyo); those who wanted to be completely free of risk should consider leaving 
Japan or travel to areas outside the 250 km zone. On March 29 the travel restriction pertaining 
to the entirety of Japan was somewhat eased: now the recommendation only applied to non-
essential travel, otherwise upholding the 80 km zone. Then on April 12 a further alleviation 
was issued removing the overall restriction to Japan: only certain prefectures, mostly in the 
Tohoku region and no longer including Tokyo, were still to be avoided (non-essential travel). 
As of May 16 (still standing as of October 2011) the recommendation maintains that all travel 
to the 80 km zone should be avoided and Swedes within the area should leave.  
 
On the subject of potassium iodide: On March 20 the Swedish Embassy began issuing iodide 
tablets to citizens as a precautionary measure. However, in contrast to all other governments, 
Sweden was the only country to actually recommend immediate intake within 250 km of 
Fukushima. This was the cause of quite a stir among the international community; the Swedes 
were recommending intake, why wasn’t their government doing the same? On March 29, 
however, the Swedish authorities lifted the recommendation. 
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Speaking with the Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission to the Swedish Embassy in Tokyo, 
he explains that the Swedish travel advice mainly is put together by the Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Swedish MFA) and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SRSA). The 
Swedish MFA authorizes and issues the travel advice, but when it comes to cases involving 
nuclear exposure, it is the SRSA that de facto makes the decision. The Swedish Embassy is a 
part of the process as well, but as the final decision lies with the Ministry, the Embassy 
representative cannot say to what extent the Embassy’s viewpoints were decisive in the 
revisions that were issued. In certain respects he personally feels the recommendations were 
too strict; he believes the general recommendation against travel to Japan could have been 
lifted earlier. “But on the other hand, the people at home don’t want to change the advice too 
often either; that is to say make small adjustments many times. They have rather chosen to 
wait a little longer in order to make a larger alteration.” 
 
As for the safety measures taken by the Embassy itself: The Embassy remained fully 
operational in Tokyo, but offered relocation to employee families if they so wished. In 
addition, two staff members chose to leave due to special personal circumstances, one of them 
for example being pregnant. The Swedish diplomat does not feel that the Swedish travel 
advice had any particular influence on Embassy affairs, especially in view of the fact that the 
Swedish Embassy chose to stay put in Tokyo. Although the Embassy did look into the 
possibility of setting up an emergency office in Kobe, there was never a serious discussion 
about leaving. In contrast to what he believes has been the case with many other embassies, 
the Swedish MFA was never involved in the question of whether or not the Swedish Embassy 
should move from Tokyo: “We never got such orders from Stockholm, and in that sense it 
was the Embassy’s decision.” He explains that since the Embassy simply stayed put, there 
was no active decision for the Ministry to approve, it was just a continuation of the status quo. 
 
As is the case with the Norwegian Embassy, the Swedish Embassy has scientific expertise 
available within its residence: The Office of Science and Innovation is collocated with the 
Swedish Embassy and typically works to promote Swedish-Japanese cooperation within 
research, innovation, higher education and sustainable development (The Embassy of 
Sweden, Tokyo, 2011). In this way the Office holds a corresponding role to Innovation 
Norway, although it does not work with export issues or private enterprise. The Head of 
Office, also designated Counsellor of Science and Innovation to the Swedish Embassy, was 
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very much involved in managing the crisis, working directly for the Swedish MFA as part of 
the Embassy crisis team. His function involved writing daily reports to the Swedish MFA on 
the nuclear situation and acting as a link between the Embassy and the Swedish nuclear 
authorities. His academic background is as a professor of physics – while not nuclear physics, 
he points out: “in the kingdom of the blind the one eyed will lead”. 
 
In the Swedish science officer’s view, all countries that issued recommendations to avoid 
travel to Japan overall were “not determined on the basis of the nuclear risk”. Personally he 
feels such recommendations were much too restrictive, which he also expressed in his 
correspondence with the SRSA and the Swedish MFA. He does, however, fully support the 
Swedish security zone set around Fukushima (80 km), including the fact that this zone was 
larger than the zones set by the Japanese authorities. Moreover, he supports the Swedish 
advice on potassium iodide, maintaining that there are few serious consequences of intake. 
 
5.2 Finland 
All in all, the Finnish authorities have issued five travel updates in connection with the Great 
East Japan Crisis. The initial recommendation of March 12 was to avoid non-essential travel 
to Japan, which two days later was supplemented with special emphasis pertaining to Tokyo 
and the northeastern regions. On March 15, “non-essential travel” was upgraded to “all 
travel”. Then, on March 17 already, the restriction on Japan overall was lifted (and due to its 
short-lived existence, the Finnish authorities did not set up any special flights for its citizens 
to leave the country). In addition, the 80 km zone around the Fukushima plant was 
introduced: Finns within the zone were advised to withdraw from the area, while those 
staying in the greater Tokyo area and north of the metropolis were recommended to travel by 
land or train to the Nagoya-Kansai area or even further south. On March 30, the Finnish 
advice was further eased, moving from “all” to “non-essential” travel to Tokyo and 
northeastern Japan, but still keeping the 80 km zone. Then, on April 21, the Tokyo area is 
removed from the restriction. What is left, is the 80 km zone restriction and a 
recommendation to avoid unnecessary travel to the hardest hit areas on the East coast of the 
prefectures Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima (still standing as of October 2011). 
 
The Minister Counsellor at the Finnish Embassy explains that the Finnish travel advice is 
established in several steps. Starting out the Embassy makes a basic assessment of the 
situation in collaboration with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Finnish MFA). If 
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possible the Embassy also confers with other agencies such as the Finnish Chamber of 
Commerce (but early on in the crisis there hardly was any time for this). As expected the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, commonly known as STUK, which is the 
Finnish acronym, is also greatly involved in the process. According to the Embassy 
representative, STUK holds complete sovereignty when it comes to things such as the 
evacuation zones: “If they say 80 km, we can’t do anything to change that. All other things 
we can somehow influence in the way we want”. The final authorization lies with the Finnish 
MFA, which also coordinates with the EU and the Nordic countries before issuing the advice. 
 
Based on the Finnish travel advice of March 17 urging citizens to avoid travel to Tokyo and 
encouraging them to transfer to safer areas further south, the Finnish Embassy on March 18 
announced that it was “transferring all its operations to Hiroshima” – Hiroshima being located 
approximately 690 kilometres southwest of Tokyo. The notification stated that the move was 
a security precaution, also pointing out that other EU member states such as Germany and 
Austria had reached similar decisions (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2011). In fact, 
the Finnish diplomat imparts that that there was quite a lot of contact with the German 
Embassy regarding such things as the practical management of personnel and relocation. “I 
know the colleagues there pretty well so it seemed easy”, she explains. According to the 
Finnish diplomat, the Embassy operations in Tokyo were fully shut down with the exception 
of one staff member handing out iodide tablets. She claims the decision to move was made 
jointly by the Finnish Embassy and the Finnish MFA. 
 
As regards Finnish staff management, a relief team was sent from the Finnish MFA in order 
to ease the workload on the Embassy employees. The Finnish delegates were also sent back to 
Finland as a part of a weekly rotation system in order for them to get some time off from the 
whole ordeal.  
 
The diplomat feels the Finnish travel advice has been appropriate considering the uncertainty 
surrounding the nuclear risks. She does, however, admit that there might have been a certain 
amount of “Chernobyl trauma” behind the Finnish reaction, considering that Finland was 
rather affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986. Furthermore she mentions two 
other factors that might have contributed to the level of concern from the authorities in 
Finland: Firstly, at the time when the crises broke out the Finnish government was 
anticipating the Finnish parliamentary election of April 17; “a few weeks before the election, 
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if we had done anything wrong (…) it would have been bad for those in government or for the 
foreign minister coming from a certain political party”. Secondly, the Finnish MFA’s 
management of the 2004 South Asian tsunami disaster was heavily criticized; this time the 
Finnish ministry did not want to risk any such criticism and kept high precaution in 
overseeing the crisis in Japan. Admittedly, such was indeed the case with all the Nordic 
countries after the South Asian disaster; all the Nordic foreign ministries received heavy 
criticism for their management of the event. 
 
In fairly close proximity to the Finnish Embassy, though not collocated in the same building, 
is the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation, commonly known as TEKES 
(Finnish abbreviation). TEKES is a state funded expert organization for promoting Finnish 
research, development, and innovation (TEKES, 2011). The office representative, holding the 
title Counsellor of Science, Technology, and Innovation, worked in close contact with the 
Finnish Embassy’s crisis management. His education is in nuclear engineering and he has 
eight years of working experience in the field prior to joining TEKES, especially pertaining to 
radiation levels and health effects. The science officer found the information from the 
Japanese authorities logical and easy to follow, but he does not doubt that it would have been 
problematic for people without his expert knowledge: “All the different kinds of sievert and 
gray and becquerel and so on; those are very complicated things, they are not just like Celsius 
or some other types of substances in measurement and that is difficult of course”. 
 
The Finnish science officer believes his expertise has been an asset to the Finnish Embassy, 
although he stresses that he did not participate in any decision-making by other means than 
just providing background information on the nuclear risks. Regarding the official decisions it 
was the nuclear authority STUK that held jurisdiction. Overall, the Finnish science officer 
agrees with the Finnish travel advice and is satisfied with the Embassy’s management of the 
situation, also defending the move to Hiroshima as a precautionary measure not due to the 
risk of a nuclear accident, but so that the Embassy could stay operational in case the 
infrastructure in Tokyo should break down. 
 
With regard to the Finnish directives on potassium iodide, the science officer supports the 
Finnish policy of issuing tablets but not recommending immediate intake; had it proven 
necessary he was confident intake instructions could be issued in time. Still he does not want 
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to pass judgment on the Swedish recommendations, conceding that hard winds from 
Fukushima could potentially have carried the nuclear fallout as far as Tokyo. 
 
5.3 Denmark 
Denmark has had a total of seven travel recommendations related to the crisis. On March 12 
Danish authorities advised against all non-essential travel to Tohoku. Then, on March 15, the 
restriction was extended to all of Japan. On March 17 a further escalation took place; all 
travel to Japan was discouraged, while citizens staying within an 80 km zone from the 
damaged plant were recommended to leave the area, and those staying in Tokyo and north of 
capital were to consider leaving the area. On April 5 the restriction on travel to Tokyo and 
Japan overall was lifted, with the exception of the Tohoku region and neighboring prefectures 
to the south and southwest, as well as the 80 km zone. On April 18 the advice was rephrased 
as pertaining to non-essential travel to the tsunami and earthquake hit areas in Tohoku, and 
the same 80 km zone. The travel advice as of May 9 (still valid as of October 2011) upholds 
the 80 km zone restriction. 
 
As opposed to the other Nordic Embassies, the Danish Embassy does not have an in-house science 
counsellor, although it did temporarily receive expertise from Copenhagen shortly after the crisis 
struck. According to the Danish Minister Counsellor/Deputy Ambassador, the Danish travel 
advice is collaboratively established by four institutions: the Danish Foreign Ministry (Danish 
MFA), the Danish Embassy in Tokyo, (and due to the nuclear issue:) the Danish Emergency 
Management Agency, and the Danish National Institute of Radiation Protection (NIRP). The 
Danish Embassy plays a substantial part in formulating the recommendations, but as with the 
other Nordic embassies, the final decision on any directive is taken by the Ministry at home. 
 
The Danish Embassy did not arrange any special flights for its citizens to leave the country, 
reckoning that there existed enough flight capacity as it was. Nor did the Danish Embassy ever 
close down its Tokyo operations. Early on, however, a few employees were sent to strengthen the 
Danish Consulate in Hiroshima in the event that an evacuation should prove necessary. The 
consulate office was provisionally staffed for approximately a week’s time before the Embassy 
was fully convinced that Tokyo would remain relatively safe; “maximum one would have to stay 
indoors for a couple of days due to radiation”. 
 
The Danish diplomat explains that several employees were sent to Denmark on shorter leave in 
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order to get a break from the heavy workload and long hours, but that this arrangement was not 
related to the nuclear threat. Accompanying family members were also offered to leave, mainly 
due to the uncertainty surrounding the general situation, but the Danish diplomat also sites the 
international media coverage as influencing this particular decision: “there was a lot of pressure to 
get out coming from family members in Denmark because CNN and others have only reported on 
the calamities and not the big picture, so they get a twisted idea of reality and become hysterical.”   
  
In the Danish diplomat’s point of view, the Danish Embassy has been successful in choosing a 
“rational” course of action. This he feels is due to the fact that the Embassy had a good deal of 
influence on its Ministry in Copenhagen. As soon as the Danish Embassy deemed the travel 
restriction on Japan overall no longer necessary, the Embassy suggested that the Ministry lift the 
restriction, and so the Danish Ministry did. Not that the diplomat believes the Danish Embassy put 
more pressure on its Ministry than what other embassies did, but he believes the Danish Embassy, 
due to continual dialogue, perhaps had greater sway on its Ministry than other embassies had. 
 
5.4 Comparing responses 
So far the Nordic crisis responses have been presented separately without much cross-
referencing; now we have come to the point where a comprehensive comparison of responses 
is called for. 
 
Starting with the decision-making processes behind the Nordic crisis responses, what 
similarities and differences can we identify here? It seems that one aspect common to all 
Nordic managements is the way in which jurisdiction is allocated between the ministries and 
their respective nuclear authorities (that is, the NRPA, SRSA, STUK, and NIRP). Regarding 
the official directives, it seems that the nuclear authorities primarily have presided over the 
technical specifics, such as safety zones and iodide distribution, while the ministries (and to a 
varying degree the embassies) have been responsible for the formulation and, thus, the 
general magnitude of the recommendations. In other words, as soon as the nuclear authorities 
have set the “hard boundaries” the ministries/embassies have the opportunity to emphasize or 
expand the restrictions as they see fit. 
 
When it comes to the allocation of power between the ministries and their respective 
embassies, however, there seem to be certain discrepancies among the Nordic regimes. 
Specifically, the discrepancies concern the degree of autonomy that the embassies hold over 
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own operations. Who actually makes the decision to relocate out of Tokyo; is it the ministry 
or the embassy? The issue was brought up by several of the representatives that were 
interviewed; generally they felt that most embassies would have chosen to remain in Tokyo, 
but those that relocated were acting upon ministry instructions. As a rule, then, it seems the 
ministries have instigated higher precaution in response to the crisis than their respective 
embassies. As the Danish diplomat explains, “the embassy has an interest in this (easing the 
travel advice), while the capitals are not so affected by it and therefore do not have the same 
incentive to have the situation return to normal as quickly as possible.” In this way, there is a 
sort of tug-of-war between ministry precaution and embassy interests. Ultimately, it is the 
amount of influence that the embassy has on its ministry that seems to be seminal in 
distinguishing the Nordic managements from one another. Both the Swedish and the Danish 
diplomat explicitly state that the decisions to maintain embassy operations in Tokyo were 
made by the respective embassies themselves. Of course, the issue is much more complex 
than this. Why is it that the ministries and the embassies have such conflicting interests in the 
first place? There are numerous factors that have influenced the various outcomes (to be dealt 
with in the following chapter), but for now, the important point is to recognize the basic 
distinction between the ministries on the one hand, and the embassies on the other. 
 
The double-page spread Table 2a, on page 46-47, shows an overview of all the travel advice 
that has been issued by the Nordic countries relating to the Great East Japan Crisis. In this 
connection we can identify at least one feature common to all the recommendations, which is 
that prediction and precaution have played important parts in their making. Official travel 
advice is based on an “overall” assessment of the situation meaning that it accounts for more 
than just the current security circumstances; the possibility that circumstances might worsen 
(for example due to a nuclear meltdown at the reactors or adverse weather conditions 
spreading the nuclear fallout far and wide) is factored into the situation assessment. In 
addition to potential hazards, practical concerns related to supply shortages and infrastructure 
breakdowns are also taken into account. However, as demonstrated in the discrepancies 
among the Nordic recommendations, the degree of safeguard has varied. 
 
Following Table 2a, on page 48, is Table 2b; this table shows an overview of the various 
actions of the Nordic managements pertaining to the relocation of embassy operations, the 
distribution of iodide tablets, and the arrangement of special flights out of Japan. Together 
Table 2a and 2b sum up all the Nordic actions and recommendations featured in this thesis.
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Table 2a: Overview of the Nordic governments’ travel advice to Japan since 11 March 2011 
 
NORWAY 
 
SWEDEN 
 
FINLAND 
 
DENMARK 
 
Establishing initial recommendations     
 
March 12 
Advises against all non-
essential travel to the areas 
hardest hit by the 
earthquake and tsunami in 
the Tohoku region. 
 
March 13: Added 
specification 
The areas in question: 
Miyagi, Iwate, Aomori, 
Akita, Yamagata, Tochigi, 
Ibaraki, and Fukushima 
northeast of Tokyo. 
 
March 13 
Advises against non-
essential travel to the 
hardest hit areas 
(prefectures) Aomori, 
Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima 
and Ibaraki.  
 
March 12 
Avoid unnecessary travel 
to Japan. 
 
March 14: Added 
specification 
Advises against non-
essential travel to Japan, 
especially to Tokyo and 
northeastern Japan. 
 
March 12 
Advises against all non-
essential travel to the 
following areas 
(prefectures) in Japan: 
Aomori, Akita, Iwate, 
Yamagata, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Tochigi, and 
Ibaraki. 
 
Heightening the alert 
 
March 15 
• From non-essential travel 
to all 
• From parts of Japan to all 
 
Advises against travel to or 
residence in Japan. 
 
March 17 
• Introduction of 80 km 
zone 
 
Advises against travel to or 
residence in Japan. 
Norwegians staying less 
than 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant are 
encouraged to leave the 
area. Norwegians living in 
the Tohoku, Chubu, and 
Kanto regions (including 
Tokyo) should consider 
leaving the area. 
 
March 20 
• Subtraction of restriction 
on Japan overall 
 
Norwegians staying less 
than 80 km... (etc. as 
above)  
 
April 1 
• Reintroduction of 
restriction on Japan 
overall, but only non-
essential travel 
 
Advises against non-
essential travel to or 
residence in Japan. 
Norwegians staying less 
than 80 km... (etc. as 
above) 
 
March 15 
• Expansion to larger area, 
including Tokyo 
 
Advises against non-
essential travel to Tokyo 
and northeastern Japan 
(Tohoku and Kanto 
regions). 
 
March 16 
• From non-essential travel 
to all 
• From parts of Japan to all  
• Introduction of 80 km 
zone 
 
Advises against all travel to 
Japan. All Swedes within a 
radius of 80 km from the 
power plant are urged to 
leave the area. 
 
March 20: Added 
specification 
There is considerable 
uncertainty about the 
further developments and 
the effects of a nuclear 
release. (…) Anyone who 
is worried by the situation, 
wanting to be sure that the 
nuclear fallout will not 
affect them, should 
consider leaving Japan or 
travel to parts of Japan 
outside the 250 km area.  
 
 
 
March 15 
• From non-essential travel 
to all 
 
Advises against all travel to 
Japan, especially to Tokyo 
and northeastern Japan. 
 
March 17 
• From all of Japan to parts 
• Introduction of 80 km 
zone 
 
Finns are urged to 
withdraw from an area 
within an 80 km radius of 
the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant. Finns in the 
greater Tokyo area and to 
the north of the metropolis 
are recommended to travel 
by land or train to the 
Nagoya–Kansai area or 
south of it. 
 
March 15 
• From parts of Japan to all  
 
Advises against all non-
essential travel to Japan. 
 
March 17 
• From non-essential travel 
to all 
• Introduction of 80 km 
zone 
 
Advises against all travel to 
Japan. Danes staying 
within a distance of 80 km 
from the Fukushima power 
plant are recommended to 
leave the area. Danes 
staying in Tokyo and north 
of Tokyo should consider 
leaving these areas.  
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(Table 2 continued…) 
 
NORWAY 
 
SWEDEN 
 
FINLAND 
 
DENMARK 
 
Easing the restrictions  
 
April 13 
• Subtraction of restriction 
on Japan overall, 
including Tokyo 
• Introduction of 150 km 
zone 
 
Advises against non-
essential travel to or 
residence in the area 
between 80 and 150 km 
form the Fukushima power 
plants. Norwegians staying 
less than 80 km from the 
power plants should leave 
the area. 
 
March 29 
• From all travel to non-
essential 
 
Now discourages only non-
essential travel to Japan. 
However, Swedish citizens 
are still advised against 
residing within 80 km of 
the Fukushima power plant. 
 
April 12 
• From all of Japan to parts 
• Subtraction of restriction 
on Tokyo 
 
Advises against non-
essential travel to the 
prefectures of Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Yamagata, 
Niigata, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Ibaraki and Saitama. Thus, 
travel to the Tokyo 
prefecture is no longer 
discouraged. The Ministry 
urges that Swedes not stay 
within 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant. 
 
March 30 
• From all travel to non-
essential  
 
Recommends avoiding 
unnecessary travel to 
Tokyo and northeastern 
Japan (Tokyo, Yokohama, 
Tohoku, and Kanto). Finns 
are recommended to 
evacuate within a distance 
of 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant.  
 
March 28 
• From all travel to non-
essential  
• From all of Japan to parts 
 
Now discourages only non-
essential travel to Tokyo 
and the areas north of the 
capital. Danes staying 
within 80 km of the 
Fukushima plant are 
advised to leave the area. 
 
April 5 
• Subtraction of restriction 
on Tokyo 
 
Now allows all travel to 
Tokyo. Advises against 
non-essential travel to the 
region north of Tokyo: the 
Tohoku region and the 
prefectures Gunma, 
Tochigi, Ibaraki, Saitama, 
and Chiba (Narita airport 
excepted). Danes staying 
within 80 km of the 
Fukushima power plant are 
advised to leave the area. 
 
April 18 
• Further subtraction of 
areas 
 
Advises against all non-
essential travel to the 
tsunami and earthquake hit 
areas in the Tohoku region. 
Danes staying within 80 km 
of the power plant are 
advised to leave the area. 
 
Long-standing current recommendations (as of Oct. 2011) 
 
June 16 
• Only the 80 km zone 
 
Advises against all travel to 
or residence in the area 
within 80 km from the 
Fukushima power plant, 
and urges all Norwegians to 
leave the area. 
 
16 May 
• Only the 80 km zone 
 
Advises against all travel 
within a radius of 80 km 
from the Fukushima power 
plant and urges Swedes not 
to stay in the area. 
 
April 21 
• Subtraction of restriction 
on Tokyo 
• Upholding the restriction 
on northeastern Japan 
and the 80 km zone 
	  
Advises against 
unnecessary travel to the 
hardest hit areas on the East 
coast of the Japanese 
prefectures Iwate, Miyagi, 
and Fukushima. All Finns 
are encouraged to leave the 
area within 80 km of the 
Fukushima power plants. 
 
9 May 
• Only the 80 km zone 
 
Advises against all travel to 
and residence in the area 
within a distance of 80 km 
from the Fukushima power 
plant. 
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Table 2b: Overview of the Nordic governments’ on security issues 
  NORWAY 
 
SWEDEN 
 
FINLAND 
 
DENMARK 
 
Relocation of 
embassy 
operations 
 
Moved to Kobe 
21/03 – 18/03 
(but never formally 
closing in Tokyo) 
 
 
Remained fully 
operational in Tokyo 
 
Moved to Hiroshima 
18/03 – 30/03 
 
Remained fully 
operational in Tokyo 
(but held an office in 
Hiroshima in reserve 
for about one week) 
 
 
Iodine tablets 
 
Issued tablets 20/03 
 
Issued tablets, also 
recommending 
intake, 20/03 
 
 
Issued tablets 15/03 
 
Issued tablets 21/03 
 
Special flight 
arrangements 
 
 
Yes, departure 19/03 
 
Yes, destination 
Bangkok, departure 
19/03 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Overall, then, how do the Nordic crisis responses measure up to each other? To begin with, it 
seems safe to ascertain that Norway and Finland generally have acted with a higher degree of 
precaution in comparison to Sweden and Denmark. Finland has perhaps shown the highest 
level of precaution in its crisis response, although a certain variation can be noted with regard 
to the official travel advice. Compared with the other Nordic recommendations, the Finnish 
travel advice started out as the most restrictive, but just a week into the crisis Finland became 
the first to subtract the restriction on Japan overall – this was about two weeks ahead of 
Denmark and almost a month ahead of Norway and Sweden. Still, Finland was the last to 
subtract its restriction on Tokyo, and the current recommendation as of April 24 maintains 
somewhat higher precaution than its Nordic counterparts. Regarding the Finnish Embassy’s 
own operations, it was the first to relocate out of Tokyo. Although returning after a short two 
weeks, the provisional office in Hiroshima was in fact kept until June 29 as a safeguard (The 
Embassy of Finland, Tokyo, 2011). In this way, both regarding the travel advice and embassy 
operations, it seems that the Finnish have operated with a higher precautionary threshold than 
the other Nordic governments, but at the same time they have perhaps been more willing to 
ease their safeguard on precautions with far-reaching consequences. “It was another way of 
doing things”, the Finnish diplomat reflects. “Perhaps we did more for our own staff (than the 
other Nordic embassies), it’s hard to say”. In this connection, it is possible that the Finnish 
association with the German Embassy regarding staff management has been of influence; the 
Germans actually being responsible for one of the strongest crisis responses among the 
international community (as imparted by several of the diplomats), it is not unlikely that the 
Finnish Embassy was somewhat influenced by the German reaction. Indeed, as previously 
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noted, the Finnish press statement announcing the Embassy relocation justified the decision 
on account of the German Embassy also deciding to move.  
 
The Norwegians have also exhibited a relatively high level of precaution in their crisis 
response, both regarding the official directives (Norway was the last of the Nordics to lift its 
travel restriction on Japan overall) and regarding the Embassy’s own security measures (the 
Norwegian Embassy relocated out of Tokyo, returning more than two weeks later than the 
Finnish Embassy). As stated in the official press release, the decision to transfer Embassy 
operations to Kobe was made by the Ministry, and even though the Ambassador insists that 
the Embassy as one – “we” – agreed with the decision to move, one may well question the 
Ambassador’s representation; the fact remains that all employees who were given the option, 
chose to remain in Tokyo, and neither the IN representative nor the NSEC representative felt 
the move was necessitated. Regardless of the Ambassador’s stance, then, our theory of 
opposing interests between ministry and embassy seems to be valid also in the Norwegian 
case. 
 
In comparison with Norway and Finland, the Swedish and Danish managements have 
displayed a lower degree of precaution, especially considering that their embassies remained 
in Tokyo. In the case of Sweden, it seems that their travel advice displays a more moderate 
tone than the other Nordic recommendations; although the Swedes may advise against 
travelling to certain areas, it seems that (apart from the 80-km zone) they have tried to avoid 
actively advising people to leave these areas, as exemplified in the posting of March 16. (The 
“added specification” of March 20 does not override the March 16 recommendation, but due 
to “considerable uncertainty” it stipulates that persons who are especially worried should 
consider leaving Japan. This may indicate that there had been inquiries from the Swedish 
public – perhaps due to the conflicting recommendations among the Nordic countries – 
necessitating further stipulation regarding the risks. It is not unlikely, however, that such an 
ambiguous specification actually just contributed to further confusion.) Yet, on the subject of 
potassium iodide it would seem that Sweden demonstrated the highest level of precaution of 
all, not only among the Nordic countries, but also among the international community at 
large. The Swedish diplomat explains: “In our way of seeing it, according to Swedish medical 
expertise, there are almost no side effects and it is safe to eat iodide tablets, so the SRSA 
might as well choose safety rather than uncertainty”. In this way, by shifting our perspective 
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from nuclear risk to medical risks of iodide intake, one could actually argue that the Swedes 
showed a lower degree of precaution also regarding their iodide policy.  
 
Of the Nordic countries, it is perhaps Denmark that shows the lowest level of precaution in its 
crisis response; the Danish authorities were the first to remove Tokyo from its travel 
restrictions, and they did not arrange any special flights to transport citizens out of Japan. The 
Danish diplomat characterizes the Danish response as a “rational” approach and believes 
“irrational” decisions often occur when there is a lack of communication between the ministry 
and the embassy: “those who made irrational decisions, they have largely been politically 
determined and it has been the capital cities that have decided without consulting with the 
embassy.” 
 
According to all the Nordic diplomats, the Nordic embassies exchanged information and were 
in close contact with each other in the weeks following the crisis outbreak. Still, it does not 
appear that the cooperation has brought about very similar crises responses. Moreover, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark all being members of the European Union, their embassies 
participated in several EU meetings with other member states. Yet neither the Swedish, 
Finnish nor Danish diplomat feels the EU connection had a particular influence on their lines 
of action. The meetings were for informational purposes only. There were indeed some initial 
attempts to reach a joint line of action regarding the travel recommendations, but these efforts 
were soon abandoned; the Swedish diplomat explains that it was “almost impossible to get 
anyone to have the exact same contents or make the same decisions”. But as he points out, an 
agreed strategy among the embassies would not have mattered much in any case since the 
travel advice is decided by the respective ministries in the capitals; a common strategy can 
only come about from cooperation between the capitals. 
 
According to the Finnish diplomat, such cooperation was in fact attempted among the EU 
member states from EU headquarters in Brussels, but as it turned out the efforts proved 
ineffective. Likewise, the Nordic ministries did attempt to establish a coordinated Nordic 
stance, but as stated by the Danish diplomat, it has “unfortunately not been successful”. 
Undoubtedly, it is in all the ministries’ best interest that such coordination succeeds, so why is 
it that the different governments are unable to reach an agreed line of action? It is in this 
situation that different political interests and cultural understandings become especially 
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apparent. The next chapter shall explore these conflicting interests further, not least with 
attention to the conflicting interests residing within nuclear science itself. 
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6. Conflicts of interests 
We have at long last reached the chapter that shall address the overarching research question: 
How can the variations among Nordic crisis responses be explained? The analysis shall be 
carried out in two parts. To begin with, the individual risk assessments among the ministries 
and embassies shall be accounted for on the basis of different political interests and cultural 
biases. Next, the judgments of the nuclear experts involved in the Nordic risk assessments 
shall be put under scrutiny so as to distinguish the underlying values that colour their 
scientific reasonings. As we shall see, the question of risk is one of individual interpretation, 
largely dependent on the particular function and context of the interpreter. 
 
6.1 Cultural biases in context 
In the preceding chapter we established a fundamental distinction between ministry and 
embassy interests. We found that the ministries generally have pushed for higher precaution 
in response to the crisis than their respective embassies. It would seem that the amount of 
influence the individual embassy has on its ministry is a decisive factor behind the various 
Nordic responses. This section shall explore further the motives behind the particular ministry 
and embassy rationales. 
 
A common conception among the subjects of this study is that the international media – 
especially compared to the Japanese media – has greatly exaggerated the nuclear threat, 
thereby igniting panic and fear among the international community. No doubt, the 
sensationalist foreign coverage in contrast to the more cautious and information-oriented 
reports of the Japanese media has increased the disparity between foreign (ministry) and local 
(embassy) perceptions of the nuclear threat. However, Nelkin makes an important point in 
asserting that “media communication is but a contributing factor to, not the primary cause of, 
the public’s attitudes and ideas”; information from the media is “assimilated and interpreted 
in different ways, depending on prior beliefs, predispositions, personal experience, and the 
attributes of peers” (Nelkin, 1989, p. 106). The effect of risk information, then, is likely to 
depend on the particular social and cultural context. 
 
In other words, in order to fully explain the different risk assessments among the Nordic 
regimes, we need to examine the cultural biases that shape individual risk perception – not 
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only in terms of the respective embassy’s autonomy in relation to its ministry (as completed 
in the previous chapter), but also in terms of the particular dispositions among the ministries, 
and the particular attitudes among the embassies. For example, is it possible that the Finnish 
MFA has more at stake in this situation than the Danish MFA? And beyond the official 
embassy stances, what can explain the individual opinions among the diplomats – some in 
favour of high precautions and some opposed? The next two subsections shall deal with the 
various cultural biases among the ministries and among the embassies respectively. 
 
6.1.1 Cultural biases of the ministries 
Throughout the course of our investigations there has been mention of several political and 
reputational interests among the Nordic ministries that have influenced the various crisis 
managements: the 2004 South Asian tsunami and the heavy criticism of its crisis management 
was seemingly a factor among all the Nordic regimes; the Finnish national elections at the 
time of the crisis further raised the stakes for Finland’s government; and the emotional impact 
of the 1986 Chernobyl accident is perhaps, to a varying degree, still present among the Nordic 
populations. All of these aspects have contributed to our understanding of why the ministries 
in the Nordic capitals have pushed for higher precautions than their respective embassies. 
 
However, in order to say anything conclusive about the extent to which these factors have 
varied among the Nordic ministries, it would be necessary to carry out further research based 
on ministry sources and on country-specific tendencies. Such is not included in the itinerary 
of this particular assignment. The focus of this study is, after all, on the concerns of the 
Nordic embassies. 
 
Still, it is tempting to hypothesize on the indicated aspects. It would, for instance, seem that 
Finland, due to national elections at the time of the crisis, had more at stake in its 
management than the other Nordic countries. And regarding the impact of Chernobyl, Finland 
received much higher radiation doses from the accident than the other Nordic countries 
(Department of Nuclear Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, 1996). Finland also 
happens to be greatly dependent on nuclear power, with four nuclear reactors providing nearly 
30% of the country’s electricity (World Nulcear Association, 2011). Perhaps this, to a certain 
degree, may explain the high precaution displayed in the Finnish crisis response relative to the 
other Nordic countries? However, we should be wary of drawing any hasty conclusions. 
Sweden is, for example, the Nordic country most dependent on nuclear power, with ten 
54	  
operating reactors providing over 40% of its electricity (World Nuclear Association, 2011). 
And of all the countries in Europe, Sweden was hardest hit by the 2004 tsunami crisis (Risk 
Management Solutions, 2005). In this way, the lower precautions of the Swedish crisis 
management are difficult to justify on this particular account. In the case of the Swedish crisis 
response, we have to remember that the Ministry did not greatly interfere with the decisions 
of the Embassy, so the rationale behind the Swedish management (at least regarding the 
embassy’s own operations) is mainly based on the incentives among the embassy officials 
themselves. Thus, the time is ripe for a comprehensive analysis of the particular biases of the 
Nordic embassies in Tokyo. 
 
6.1.2 Cultural biases of the embassies 
Officially representing the ministries abroad, the Nordic embassies in Tokyo share their 
ministries’ concerns and interests. But at the same time, the embassies also have to answer to 
the concerns of the local public, that is, the concerns of Nordic nationals residing in Japan, 
and the concerns of Nordic businesses with dealings in Japan. Dealing with public interests at 
the local level is a fundamental part of an embassy’s constitutional function, as for example 
stipulated in the general contingency plans of the Norwegian management (as noted in 
Chapter 3). Thus, the embassies are pulled between the interests of their ministries (preferring 
higher precautions) and the interests of their local publics (preferring lower precautions). 
 
Here one might aptly wonder how we so unequivocally may assert that the public will 
demand a lower precautionary level than what the authorities establish in the official 
directives. As earlier mentioned, the typical situation in questions regarding scientific and 
technological regulation is that the authorities push for greater acceptance of the risks while 
the public resists and demands a higher degree of government regulation. Why is this not the 
case regarding the regulation of travel and residency in Japan in connection with the nuclear 
crisis? Arguably, the reason has to do with the fact that the increased levels of radiation 
cannot be diminished by regulation. And contrary to traditional risk regulation where the 
regulatory standards are compulsory, the official directives set by the Nordic ministries and 
embassies are only guidelines and not legally binding. In this way, there is no point in pushing 
for stricter directives; those who feel threatened by the risk are free to act with a higher degree 
of precaution than what the authorities have recommended. Conversely, there is incentive to 
push for more lenient directives; people with business interests in Japan obviously wish to 
maintain their activities without any restraints, and the foreign residents that have chosen to 
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remain in Japan may also feel burdened by the security restrictions due to, for instance, 
reduced insurance coverage depending on where they are situated. Some foreign residents 
may simply resent the mass departure that such warnings bring about in solidarity with the 
Japanese people who have to stay behind and cope with the situation. 
 
In this connection, the head of the IN Tokyo office (unfortunately not present at the 
Norwegian Embassy in the period that I conducted my interviews) has a blog entitled 
“Standpoint Tokyo” in which one of his postings, describing the initial days of the crisis, 
contains a particularly elucidatory passage of his identification with the Japanese locals:  
 
“I went to our local dry-cleaner and found the man behind the counter ironing a fresh load of 
shirts. How was he doing? I asked. He looked at me with calm eyes while counting my garments. 
Well, his family was at an evacuation centre in Fukushima. They were among those who had been 
evacuated as a result of the uncertain situation at the nuclear plant. He had not been in contact with 
them yet, but assumed things were ok. The man was genuinely concerned and worried, but exuded 
a tranquillity that made me feel ashamed. Who were we foreigners to be stirring up such panic? 
(…) When I went to the office that day I noticed that the construction workers that I passed every 
day had completed the groundwork on the site. Park workers had cleared space for spring flowers 
in the park. At the Starbucks café by the office they were surprised. Was I not leaving like the 
other foreigners? The answer was simple. I knew in my gut that I was safe. I’m staying, I said. The 
job was not yet finished. Now the task is reopening our office in a responsible manner.” 
(Kristensen, 2011) 
 
The remarkable aspect of the above account is the fact that it penetrates and refutes such 
cursory conceptions of a uniquely Japanese hardiness in face of adversity (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). Despite his position as an expat, the IN Head shares in the collective pride of the 
Japanese community and takes on responsibility for its endurance and reconstruction. 
Moreover, he recognizes the distress behind the Japanese dry-cleaners composed exterior, 
something foreigners often would have trouble picking up on. Thus, the international media’s 
frequent reference to the “stoicism” displayed in the reactions of the Japanese people, while 
possibly based on observation, may in fact be misleading because it does not explain the 
social reasons behind the restraint. Japan’s history of war and natural disaster, not to mention 
the high density of its population, has no doubt fostered a certain resilience and altruism 
favouring social harmony over the more Western value of individualism. But to interpret the 
Japanese as unfeeling in their emotional reservation, as many foreigners easily do, would be a 
misunderstanding. The IN Head, however, being familiar with Japanese mannerisms, has 
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learned to understand the Japanese social codes. In the course of his account, we see how his 
interaction with his local environment has a definitive impact on his assessment of the 
situation: “I knew in my gut that I was safe”, he concludes.  
 
However, not all the diplomats have felt the same personal reassurance in face of the nuclear 
threat. As seen in the course of this study, there have, for example, been different opinions on 
the necessity of embassy relocation. How can such variations among the Nordic diplomats be 
explained? In the following it is my intention to argue that the extent to which the individual 
diplomat has become integrated in the Japanese community plays an important part in shaping 
that diplomat’s perception and attitude regarding the nuclear crisis in Japan. 
 
To illustrate my point, a short detour by way of an analogy provided by Thompson (1986) 
may be useful. Thompson transports us to the native communities of the Himalayan valleys in 
Nepal. Here it is that the Sherpa people engage in the precarious business of Himalayan trade 
and mountaineering while at the same time displaying a “cheerful acceptance of appalling 
risk”. As it so happens, these risk-accepting “adventurous traders” live side by side with the 
risk-averse community of “cautious cultivators”. Since it turns out that the adventurous 
traders are all Buddhists and the cautious cultivators are all Hindus, conventional 
anthropology may be quick to identify culture (shared values and beliefs) as the main reason 
behind an individual’s particular risk strategy. But, as Thompson points out, we should be 
cautious in drawing such definite conclusions, because “once you start asking questions about 
change – about becoming rather than just being – then the cracks begin to appear. (…) 
Culture, far from giving an explanation, becomes a way of ducking out of giving an 
explanation” (Thompson, 1986, pp. 116-117). Instead, Thompson argues that culture is a 
function of one’s social context. The Sherpa lives in a highly individualized social context in 
which the risks he takes, and any potential rewards, are his own. His Hindu neighbour, 
however, exists in a highly collectivized context in which there is little incentive for personal 
risk-taking. In this manner, Thompson distinguishes between the cultural biases and the 
different styles of risk-handling that accompany those biases. This approach by way of a 
social context explanation, not only considers “how the adventurous traders and cautious 
cultivators are”, but also takes into account the sorts of “reorientations that would be entailed 
in the conversion processes (…) by which each can become the other” (ibid. p. 118). 
Thompson goes on to show how it is possible for Buddhists to become Hindus and vice versa. 
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At this point, the parallel to the Nordic diplomats in Japan becomes intelligible: As with the 
two neighbouring communities in the Himalayan mountains, the Nordic diplomats live side 
by side with native Japanese who have a very different outset in understanding the nuclear 
risk, as discussed in Chapter 3. To a varying degree, the diplomats interact with the locals and 
assimilate to their local surroundings. How do the particular embassy contexts affect diplomat 
integration into Japanese society? Here, a methodical application of Cultural Theory offers us 
further insight. 
 
Let us recall the grid/group dimensions from Douglas’ model. Regarding the internal 
environments of the embassies, such bureaucratic cultures typically fall under the category of 
positional hierarchies in which all roles are ascribed and all behaviour governed by positional 
rules. Such a setup involves a high level of social regulation as well as a high level of social 
incorporation (high grid/high group). However, although the social incorporation within the 
individual embassies may be strong – perhaps stronger than at other work places given the 
fact that the diplomats are far away from friends and family at home – it is not uncommon for 
diplomats to remain in association only with other expatriates and never to create close 
personal bonds with the locals. And Japanese society in particular, with its peculiar culture 
and language, is perhaps especially difficult to penetrate. (By virtue of growing up as the 
child of a diplomat myself, and actually spending six years as an expat in Tokyo, such was 
indeed my experience.) In this way, the social relations of diplomats are largely tied to the 
embassy or work-related acquaintances, but incorporation may remain low regarding 
Japanese integration. 
 
Arguably, this is particularly true for the higher-ups within the organization, who – although 
they have a broad set of contacts through their work – are more restricted in their interaction 
with the local community. The role of an ambassador, for instance, involves strong grid 
controls in the form of propriety and protocol, which may limit social integration with the 
locals. Such a category of “cultural isolates” (high grid/low group) would, according to 
Douglas, include individuals such as the Queen of England, “hedged around as she is by 
protocol” (Douglas, 2006, p. 6). Accordingly, we may well argue that such circumstances, 
although to a slighter extent, also apply to an ambassadorial position. Moreover, as with the 
Norwegian Embassy, it was mainly the Ambassador himself who held direct communication 
with the Norwegian authorities at home. In this way, it is plausible that the higher-ranking 
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embassy officials are more exposed to and influenced by the interests of their respective 
ministry (demanding a high precautionary strategy) than their subordinates. 
 
All in all, it seems a reasonable contention that, in face of the nuclear threat, the embassy 
diplomats with few personal ties to their Japanese communities have been more prone to opt 
for a higher degree of precaution, i.e. embassy relocation, than those more integrated in 
Japanese society who in different ways feel a greater social responsibility to remain. 
Proficiency within the Japanese language is undoubtedly an effective catalyst of integration, 
and as it so happens, the IN Head from the above passage is himself a competent Japanese 
speaker. As we recall from the theoretical review in Chapter 2, Cultural Theory is based on 
the idea that all cultures are inherently opposed to one another and represent incompatible 
forms of social organization. Our analysis has nonetheless shown that cultural assimilation is 
a significant and inevitable part of foreign exchange in a globalized world. Still, Cultural 
Theory’s concept of “cultural betrayal” may in fact offer some insight regarding the cultural 
sensitivity and stigma surrounding the expatriate decision to relocate away from the nuclear 
threat. Reportedly, the fly-jin expatriates, upon returning to their jobs in Japan, had to face 
“ostracism and anger from their colleagues who had worked through the crisis” (Wall Street 
Journal, 2011). Yet according to Cultural Theory, “their intransigence is neither irrational nor 
immoral. It expresses their loyalties and moral principles, and their responsibilities to other 
members of their society” (Douglas, 2006, pp. 9-10). 
 
In conclusion, the different crisis responses among the Nordic embassies cannot be explained 
on account of cultural generalizations or on politics alone; the various risk perceptions and 
assessments are the outcome of several interrelated aspects, all essentially having to do with 
what the community judges as right and wrong, and what amount of influence the community 
exerts on the individual. In short, the Nordic risk assessments are a product of social 
interaction. As Lidskog and Sundqvist assert: “Risk is for sociology always a particular risk 
situated in a specific context” (Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2012). 
 
Before we bring our analysis to a close, however, we are compelled as STS researchers to 
further scrutinize the scientific judgments of the Nordic nuclear authorities. Based on the 
Nordic science officers at least, there seemed to be general consensus on the relative danger 
of radiation exposure, so why were their scientific reasonings unable to harmonize the Nordic 
crisis responses? 
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6.2 The politics of science 
“A layperson might well think that if the experts meet quietly and come up with a technical 
answer, either that it is safe, or that it is not safe, the disagreement would be speedily settled. 
But, no; the problem involves low probabilities and high levels of uncertainty” (Douglas, 
1994, p. 38). Indeed, although the Nordic science officers mainly agree on the radiation risks, 
this is clearly not the case when it comes to the question of appropriate margins of safety in 
public policy. 
 
The contrasting views on the issue of potassium iodide as expressed by the Finnish and the 
Swedish science officers effectively illustrate how different values and biases affect their 
scientific judgments. At the outset, both the Finnish and the Swedish science officer seem to 
agree on the basic risks of iodide intake; the Finnish science officer characterizes them as 
“minor”, the Swedish science officer as “marginal”. In fact, none of the Nordic nuclear 
authorities inform (on their web-pages) of any other side effects than a few stomach or skin 
problems. All the same, the Finnish science officer maintains that intake is a complicated 
matter for several reasons. To begin with, iodide intake will only protect against thyroid 
cancer, not against any other causes of radiation poisoning. Although the Chernobyl accident 
produced a considerable increase in thyroid cancer, particularly in children, these children 
lived in the inlands and rarely ate any iodide-rich seafoods, leaving their thyroids very 
susceptible to the radioactive fallout. “In Japan it’s a little bit different because people eat a 
lot of fish and seaweed, which has got a lot of iodine”. Moreover, protective effects of iodide 
tablets only last for about 36 hours so the timing of intake is crucial. Thus, the Finnish science 
officer argues that iodide intake only should be administered when exposure levels threaten to 
become hazardous. 
 
The Swedish science officer, however, defends the Swedish intake instructions as a 
reasonable precaution in face of uncertain events. Based on the briefings he attended at the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Swedish science officer did not feel that the Japanese 
authorities were sufficiently prepared for any eventualities: “You asked the question of when 
iodide tablets were to be distributed and the response from the Japanese authorities was 
‘Yeah, we’ll get back to you tomorrow’. Naturally you think to yourself ‘Yeah, but what if 
the accident happens now?’” Thus, the Swedish nuclear authority reasoned that immediate 
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intake was prudent seeing as it was doubtful that the Japanese government in the event of an 
emergency would manage to issue intake instructions in time. 
 
It becomes clear that the Finnish and the Swedish science officers emphasize different 
precautionary principles and practical concerns. Although they seem to agree on the technical 
risks, they cannot reach accord regarding acceptable directives for public policy. “On this 
issue of acceptability nothing decisive can be said by experts”, Douglas asserts (1994, p. 38). 
In fact, not even when experts agree on both the technical questions and the appropriate 
policy directives, may we presume that their judgments are founded on scientific objectivity. 
 
As it turns out, the 80-km security zone – a policy decision that all the Nordic science officers 
supported – seems to be based more on practicalities than on scientific method. Looking at a 
map, it becomes apparent that an 80-km zone comes close, but does not reach, the city of 
Sendai – the largest city in the Tohoku region at a distance of approximately 100 km from the 
Fukushima plant. In this way, the Swedish science officer explains, the 80-km zone was 
convenient because it offered generous margins of safety while at the same time steering clear 
of the most populous areas in the region; most foreign authorities had relatively few citizens 
within the zone. On this account, then, the question arises: who came up with the 80-km zone 
in the first place? It all started on March 16, the Swedish science officer explains; U.S. 
citizens were recommended to evacuate from within a 50-mile radius of the Fukushima 
nuclear plant – 50 miles approximately corresponding to 80 km. This raised concern among 
the international community regarding the adequacy of the Japanese 20-km zone, and as a 
result, many governments chose to follow suit in setting an 80-km security zone around the 
Fukushima nuclear plant. No doubt, the U.S. maintains an internationally influential role 
possessing highly sophisticated scientific resources. However, subsequent reports have 
revealed that the U.S. nuclear authorities did not use any data from the site to determine the 
80-km distance, but that the decision was based on the “potential” conditions of the reactors 
(The Japan Times, 2011). 
 
This shows how technical framings of issues often are based on false assumptions of 
“scientific rationality”. As previously established, the Nordic nuclear authorities have been in 
charge of determining such “technicalities” as the safety zone boundaries and the basic need 
for potassium iodide, but low probabilities and high levels of uncertainty render objective 
deductions practicably impossible. Given the difficulty of predicting the outcome of events, 
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and not least the scientific uncertainty surrounding nuclear radiation itself, the Norwegian 
science officer considers it inevitable that the dealings of the nuclear authorities involve a lot 
of “guesswork”: 
 
“Even they (the NRPA) are very vague. The reason for this is that there doesn’t exist any reliable 
empirical data on the health effects of radiation exposure. Fukushima is the third example in 
history of a large population being exposed to radiation; you have the two atomic bomb explosions 
and Chernobyl, and that’s it. And beyond that, such things as radiation limits of 20 millisievert or 
a specific amount of becquerel, those are more or less random figures. There are few empirical 
studies on the effects of radiation exposure to large populations. So this discussion involves as 
much guesswork as it is does science. (…) The NRPA has provided the information and then 
others do the assessment.”	  
 
On this account, the Norwegian science officer expresses concern over the interpretation of 
inconclusive scientific data by policy-makers who might have agendas of their own. Herein, 
we can see what Nelkin refers to as the “scientist’s dilemma” begin to take form; as scientist’s 
are drawn into discussions of public policy, they are confronted with normative principles and 
moral issues regarding the appropriate role of scientists in public decision-making. As Nelkin 
puts it: “The concern is what ought to be done, whereas science itself ‘can only chart the 
consequences of what might be done’ (quoting Ziman 1968)” (Nelkin, 1971, p. 106).  
 
Possessing knowledge that is indispensible for politics and public policy, scientists have 
become increasingly aware “of the power and social responsibility embodied in their 
professional position”, Nelkin claims (Nelkin & Pollak, 1982, p. 99). Relating to the Nordic 
science officers, then, it may seem that they have thought of their social responsibility in 
terms of distributing technical knowledge to the public in a “comprehensible” way. The 
Nordic science officers did in fact join forces in circulating a Word-document with various 
sources of interpreted data regarding the nuclear situation – “graphs to show what the reading 
is, that kind of thing”, the Swedish science officer explains. He is critical of the “pedagogics” 
in the way the Japanese government has communicated the nuclear risks to the public with a 
lot of raw data and little interpretation. “So what has been lacking is science communication”, 
he asserts. He recalls: “You could hear about radiation levels in Tokyo increasing three times; 
three times compared to what? It’s three times higher than normal, but the radiation level in 
Tokyo is twice lower than the Swedish average. So I sometimes wrote in the reports ‘now the 
radiation level in Tokyo has increased to the normal level in Sweden’”. 
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Clearly, the task of effectively communicating complex scientific information to the public is 
challenging and requires a certain amount of translation. However, although the intention of 
the Nordic science officers’ informational document was to bridge the gap between expert 
knowledge and lay comprehension, what often is the case when scientists attempt to affect the 
distribution of knowledge, instead of bringing clarity to the issue, they end up exposing 
conflicting technical views within the scientific community, thus raising public doubts about 
the neutrality and independence of science (Nelkin & Pollak, 1982, p. 100). 
 
In this connection, even the IAEA’s basic numerical rating of the Fukushima accident on the 
International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) – which primary purpose is “to facilitate 
communication and understanding between the technical community, the media, and the 
public on the safety significance of events” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011) – 
has in fact worked to the contrary of its objective. To begin with, the method of calculation 
has been subject to various forms of interpretation, and moreover, the simplistic numeric 
scaling has proven inadequate in conveying the complexity surrounding the security situation. 
The Fukushima accident was initially ranked at INES level 5 (March 18) by treating each 
reactor at the plant as a separate event, but later on (April 12), the reactors were grouped into 
a single incident, raising the rating level to 7, the maximum scale value (Nature, 2011). All of 
a sudden, the Fukushima rating was on par with that of Chernobyl, creating confusion and 
unease among the public. Yet the radioactive leaks from Fukushima were, at the time, 
estimated to be only one-tenth of those released by Chernobyl (The Japan Times, 2011). 
 
Adding to the public concern is the fact that it is the national regulator that determines the 
INES rating of an emergency. Undoubtedly, this gives rise to certain conflicts of interest and 
the Japanese authorities have indeed been accused of downplaying the severity of the 
accident. Likewise, the dual function of the IAEA – both to promote nuclear energy and to 
regulate its use – has been seriously questioned following the Fukushima nuclear crisis 
(Nature, 2011). One may indeed speculate over such equivocal directives as the IAEA’s 
recommendation to nuclear facilities that radiation levels should be kept “as low as 
reasonably achievable” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011) – a decree raising 
obvious questions of interpretation. 
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As we can see, even scientific experts and authorities, often held to represent a neutral and 
“pure” form of knowledge, are not exempt from individual and cultural biasing; they too are 
coloured by their particular role and function in the controversy they are taking part in. In the 
end, decisions about risk issues require value judgments and are not resolvable by scientific 
expertise alone. Consequently, risks cannot be understood as a calculation disconnected from 
society. Rather, they are a product of how individuals in specific social settings understand 
and manage certain phenomena in accordance with their cultural environment and structural 
position in society. This is the fundamental reason why the responses to the nuclear crisis 
have been so diverse. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
This final chapter shall sum up the main findings of the thesis. It shall also go over certain 
relatable aspects that have not been dealt with in this study, but which would form an 
interesting basis for further research. 
 
7.1 Main Findings 
In reviewing our main findings, let us start by recalling the two central research questions: 
 
(1) In connection with the Fukushima nuclear crisis, how has the Norwegian Embassy 
responded to the situation, and what considerations and interests have influenced this 
crisis response? 
 
(2) Seeing that the Nordic embassies have responded to the crisis in different ways, how can 
such different strategies be explained? 
 
With reference to the first research question, we found that the Norwegian crisis response has 
been based on several factors beyond just technical risk assessment. Our investigations have, 
for example, shown how the Embassy’s particular mandate has had a definite impact on its 
judgment of an appropriate course of action. Whereas the Embassy’s main objective is to 
ensure the safety and wellbeing of Norwegian citizens in Japan, the primary mission of both 
Innovation Norway and the Norwegian Seafood Export Council is to look out for Norwegian 
corporate interests; the Embassy has therefore been prone to instigate higher precautions than 
IN or the NSEC. However, due to the social stigma surrounding the issue of evacuation, the 
Embassy has shown reluctance in conveying to the public its decision to relocate out of 
Tokyo in response to the nuclear threat. In other words, social code and obligation have 
played an important role in shaping the Norwegian Embassy’s management of the situation. 
 
Relating to the second research question, our study has shown that the Nordic crisis responses 
all have been based on the principle of precaution, although the degree of safeguard has 
varied. We found that the Norwegian and Finnish crisis responses generally have displayed a 
higher level of precaution than that of the Swedish and the Danish. This was especially 
evident in the fact that the Norwegian and Finnish embassies temporarily relocated further 
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away from the nuclear hazard, whereas the Swedish and Danish embassies chose to remain in 
Tokyo. Seeing as the Norwegian and Finnish embassy relocations mainly were instigated 
upon ministry instructions, whereas the Swedish and Danish embassies themselves chose to 
remain in Tokyo, we were able to identify a fundamental distinction between ministry and 
embassy interests. 
 
We found that the ministries generally have pushed for higher precaution in response to the 
crisis than their respective embassies. The reason is that the ministries are situated a far 
distance away from the crisis and are not themselves affected by such extensive safety 
measures and travel restrictions. Various political and reputational concerns, as well as 
sensationalist foreign media accounts, have contributed to heightening the precautionary 
thresholds among the Nordic ministries. All in all, the ministries would prefer to err on the 
side of caution rather than face criticism for not sufficiently protecting their citizens. 
 
In contrast, the embassies experience the crisis first-hand and are directly affected by the 
official security restrictions pertaining to residency and business in Japan. Thus, they are 
more inclined to push for a return to normalcy and business as usual. By way of a methodical 
application of Cultural Theory, we found that embassy diplomats with few personal ties to 
their Japanese communities were more prone to opt for a higher degree of precaution, i.e. 
embassy relocation, than those more integrated in Japanese society who in different ways felt 
a greater social responsibility to remain. In this way, our analysis has shown that we must go 
beyond cultural generalizations in order to explain the variation in risk perceptions. An 
adequate theory of risk must focus on the particular social and contextual factors within a 
cultural setting. 
 
Our analysis has also shown how scientific information often lends itself to varying 
interpretations. Low probabilities and high levels of uncertainty render objective deductions 
practicably impossible. Thus, scientists and policy-makers alike are given leeway to interpret 
evidence in a manner that best suits their own purposes. In the end, decisions about risk issues 
are not resolvable by scientific expertise alone because they require value judgments. 
 
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
The focus of this study has been on the Nordic embassies in Tokyo and the various concerns 
that have shaped their crisis responses. The Nordic foreign ministries, as commanding 
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authorities to the embassies, have therefore been an integral part of this study. However, the 
political interests of the Nordic ministries as presented in this thesis have only been 
indicators, so further investigations into the particular ministry rationales and the political 
climates of the Nordic governments would be interesting for future research; is there perhaps 
a correlation between, say, a country’s nuclear climate and its precautionary response to the 
Fukushima crisis? In context of a larger European backdrop, it would be interesting to see if 
there exist any overall trends among the various political regimes and cultures – not only with 
respect to the immediate crisis responses, but also in light of the significant re-evaluations of 
existing nuclear power programs that has taken place in a number of countries following the 
Fukushima accident. 
 
Another question pertinent to further research concerns the role of the IAEA and the post-
Fukushima calls to redefine and strengthen its mandate. The French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy has, for example, argued the need for legally binding international standards on 
nuclear safety so as to harmonize international crisis responses for the future (BBC News, 
2011). As a furtherance of this thesis, then, it would be interesting to explore whether binding 
regulatory standards are better suited to handle an international crisis such as Fukushima. 
Based on our current findings, however, and emphasis on social context as a decisive factor to 
individual risk perceptions, it is quite possible that such standardized directives would prove 
counterproductive; the non-binding directives of the IAEA could not unify or appease the 
international community in their crisis responses, so why would binding regulations be any 
different? Or put differently, would millions of Japanese residents within, say, an 80-km 
radius of the Fukushima power plant willingly have evacuated their homes and occupations 
just because they were required to by law? The question of a supreme scientific regulator 
touches upon a central thematic discussion of technocratic vs. democratic framings of risk. 
Here STS researchers often maintain that experts and regulators alone should not define risk 
issues as such a restriction often renders other important aspects invisible. It is essential that 
the public and other stakeholders be included in the decision-making processes of risk 
governance so as to make room for the inevitable influence of cultural and social factors. 
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